On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
> On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
>>> 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or
>>> by something else that does
>>> 2. I ontologically exist
>>> 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
>>> 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist.
>>> Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards
>>> to here
>> 5. But the UD exists only mathematically.
>> Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence.
>>> There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology
>>> of mathematics.
>> For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a
>> general mathematical agreement.
> No there isn't.
What is the disagreement?
>> There may be no philosophical
>> argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non
> Ontology is philosophy. You can't settle ontological quesitons
> with mathematical proofs.
Philosophy, or theology. OK. But comp is an assumption in cognitive-
science/philosophy/theology. It is an assumption that a form of
reincarnation is possible. This is not pure mathematics. UDA belongs
to the intersection of cognitive and physic science. UDA is not purely
>>> You are aware. are you not, that philosophers
>>> and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking
>>> and defending Platonism and other approaches?
>> Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as something
>> far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all
>> mathematicians agree.
> I am not concerned with argument about how many pixies exist.
So a doubt about the existence of a large cardinal in set theory rise
a doubt about the existence of seven?
I have use arithmetical realism, because I have never met any
difficulty, among mathematicians, physicians and computer scientist.
Nor even with philosophers, except some which just dodge the issues of
showing what they miss in the argument.
My work has been indeed rejected in Brussels, by philsophers. But it
has been defended a s a PhD thesis by a jury with mathematician,
computer scientist, physician (yes, not physicist, but doctor!).
> The point remains: there *is* a debate so there is *not* a standard
>> It is believed explcitly by many physicists too,
>> like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in physics.
> I never said no-on beliieves Platonism. I said some
> people belive other things. Therefore it is contentious,
> therefore it is needs jsutification.
It is more efficacious to see if the consequence of comp, believed by
many, are verified by nature.
>>>> By comp, the ontic
>>>> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can
>>>> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson
>>>> is already enough.
>>> I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist.
>> This may be the root of your problem.
>>>> comp = CTM.
>>> It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in
>>> your SANE paper.
>> All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 = 4".
> Nope, mere truth does not buy the immaterial existence of a UD
But from "2+2 = 4" and CT, you can derive the existence of UD.
>>> Classical logic is just a formal rule.
>> It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In
>> computer science people admit that a running program will either
>> or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use of
>> classical logic.
> It still does not demonstrate the immaterial existence of computers
> no-one has built.
No one has ever build the prime numbers.
>>> Bivalence is not Platonism
>> Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully
>> "arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and
>> Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology).
> Even more reason to distinguish between AR qua truth and AR qua
Yes, and I use only AR qua truth.
I may ask you what are your evidence for a primary matter, or for your
notion of AR qua physical existence.
>>> So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the
>>> to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still
>>> *probably* correct.
>> You are telling me that if you are material, then you are material.
> I am telling you I do not have to give equal weight to
> every hypothesis.
>>>> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the
>>> What issue?
>> CTM and weak materialism are epistemologically incompabible.
> Not demonstrated.
You have pointed on invisible or implicit errors only, up to now.
In your preceding post, you even argue somehow that you cannot show me
the errors because they are invisible.
At least you don't argue against the first person indeterminacy
(unlike Chalmers who pretends that after a duplication between W and M
you feel yourself to be simultaneously at the two places).
I think you have difficulties with MGA, but if you are interested we
can go back to the MGA posts, and you could explain precisely what you
feel to be missing.
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