Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>:
>>>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
>>>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
>>>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
>>>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
>>>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
>>>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
>>>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
>>>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
>>> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations
>>> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the
>>> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how
>>> 2 different physical process could generate the same computation
>>> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two
>>> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing
>>> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ?
>>> Regards,
>>> Quentin
>> Try substituting "lengths" for "computations".  Are lengths primary
>> because the same length can occur in different physical objects?
>> Brent
> Why would I ? It's not the same thing at all... You could have said
> substitute by 'red'... there are multiple physical red object.
> The thing is you can come up with an infinity of physical (possible)
> realisation for a given computation. So the question is what is
> linking the computation to the physical realisation if not the
> abstract rules (which don't exists with physicalism, because there
> exists only "realized" computations... no abstract thing) ?

Lengths are abstract to, but we don't take them to be fundamental. 
Your reasoning is Platonism; you end up reifying every abstraction 
simply because they are common to multiple realizations.


> Regards,
> Quentin

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