On 28 Aug, 22:47, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
> >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >>>>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>:
> >>>>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> >>>>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
> >>>>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
> >>>>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
> >>>>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
> >>>>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
> >>>>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
> >>>>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
> >>>> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations
> >>>> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the
> >>>> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how
> >>>> 2 different physical process could generate the same computation
> >>>> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two
> >>>> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing
> >>>> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ?
> >>>> Regards,
> >>>> Quentin
> >>> Try substituting "lengths" for "computations". Are lengths primary
> >>> because the same length can occur in different physical objects?
> >>> Brent
> >> Why would I ? It's not the same thing at all... You could have said
> >> substitute by 'red'... there are multiple physical red object.
> >> The thing is you can come up with an infinity of physical (possible)
> >> realisation for a given computation. So the question is what is
> >> linking the computation to the physical realisation if not the
> >> abstract rules (which don't exists with physicalism, because there
> >> exists only "realized" computations... no abstract thing) ?
> > Lengths are abstract to, but we don't take them to be fundamental.
> > Your reasoning is Platonism; you end up reifying every abstraction
> > simply because they are common to multiple realizations.
> > Brent
> I still disagree (about your wording game)... computation is not a
> property of a thing like a length is, it's a process.
That's a difference that doesn't make a difference
There are any number of examples of multiply instantiable processes---
and so on.
> And yes I assume abstract rules simply exists... that's what allows me
> to build "concrete" realisation of such computation.
People who don't believe in the immaterial existence of abstract rules
can do that too.
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