On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is  
> >> responsible
> >> for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume
> >> some form of naturalism/materialism or computationalism).OK? If not,
> >> your brain (generalized or not) does not obeys to the laws of  
> >> physics.
>
> > That may buy you no more than "mere" simulation. The CTM is a
> > stronger claim than the computability of physics. it means that you
> > will
> > get actual implementation (strong AI) and not just simulation (weak
> > AI)
>
> In that sense, I am OK here. Actually strong AI is even weaker than  
> CTM.

Be that as it may, neither is directly implied by the computability of
physics

>My reconstitution can believe wrongly that he is me, yet  
> conscious. But I was assuming some naturalism here, and if the  
> physical laws are computable, and I still say no to the doctor, then  
> my identity is no more defined by the computation, but by the actual  
> matter which constitutes me,

That is one reason for saying no. Another is that your identity *is*
given
by the computation (in line with the idea that PM is propertiless),
and that
the computation needs to run "on the metal" (at 0 levelsof
virtualisation)
to be genuinely conscious and not just an ersatz functional
equivalent.

>and then comp (CTM) is no more correct  
> (although strong AI could still be correct).
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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