On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:

> On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
>>> On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>> On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>> If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is
>>>> responsible
>>>> for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume
>>>> some form of naturalism/materialism or computationalism).OK? If  
>>>> not,
>>>> your brain (generalized or not) does not obeys to the laws of
>>>> physics.
>>> That may buy you no more than "mere" simulation. The CTM is a
>>> stronger claim than the computability of physics. it means that you
>>> will
>>> get actual implementation (strong AI) and not just simulation (weak
>>> AI)
>> In that sense, I am OK here. Actually strong AI is even weaker than
>> CTM.
> Be that as it may, neither is directly implied by the computability of
> physics

We agree on this.

>> My reconstitution can believe wrongly that he is me, yet
>> conscious. But I was assuming some naturalism here, and if the
>> physical laws are computable, and I still say no to the doctor, then
>> my identity is no more defined by the computation, but by the actual
>> matter which constitutes me,
> That is one reason for saying no.

But then biology makes you at most seven years old. We do have  
evidence that our body molecules are replaced rather quickly.

> Another is that your identity *is*
> given
> by the computation (in line with the idea that PM is propertiless),
> and that
> the computation needs to run "on the metal" (at 0 levelsof
> virtualisation)
> to be genuinely conscious and not just an ersatz functional
> equivalent.

But then you say no the digit-doctor and CTM is abandoned.



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