On 28 Aug, 15:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 28 Aug 2009, at 13:47, Flammarion wrote: > > > > > On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote: > > >> I can only hope you will work on the UDA+MGA, and understand that > >> "non-theoretical" truth have to be redefined as theoretical > >> possibilities (consistencies) observed from inside (from some first > >> person point of view). > > > There is no UD. > > You are meaning "no physical UD". I don't need a physical UD in the > reasoning. I mean no existent UD, material or immaterial > >>>> Thanks for quoting my sane2004 definition of comp, and showing that > >>>> indeed platonism is not part of it. > > >>> "It is a version of Platonism" > > >> The wording is not important. > > > Maybe you could flag the wording that we are supposed > > to take serioulsy. > > I have explained to you why it is preferable to avoid the term > "Platonism" for the belief that classical logic can be applied in > arithmetic I think the term Arithmetical Realism should be avoided when it is not clear whether it is a claim about truth or about existence. >. Even mathematicians does not call that Platonism, which > they use for the general idea that classical logic applies to a much > larger part of math. Arithmetical realism is better: it is the belief > that the truth of arithmetical sentence exists independently of any > means (humans, theories, machines, universes, ...) to study them. > > > > >> The point is that in the assumption of > >> CTM, (CT+ the theological act of faith), I am using that "version of > >> platonism" only, which is just the idea that classical logic can be > >> applied to arithmetical sentences, and in the conclusion, only, we > >> have to abandon weak materialism or CTM. > > > Nope. Assumptions about truth don't get you a UD which is capable of > > simulating me. You need > > a claim about existence. > > You told me this before, and I did explain that I am use the truth of > the existential statement in arithmetic, as my unique claim about > existence. And I put forward the counterargument that you can have true statements about existence, where the existence in question is not literal ontological existence. You need to argue that backwards- E means RITSIAR, and not just "existence" in some fictional or formal structure. > > You argument is either based on Platonism or > > invalid > > Yes, it based on Turing theorem, which with CT can be sump up by > "universal digital machines exist". > > > > >>>> Just arithmetical realism without which CT has no meaning at all. > > >>> The CT thesis requires some mathematical > >>> claims to be true. it doesn't require numbers to actually exist > > >> I have never asserted that numbers actually exist. Just that they > >> exist in the sense of the usual interpretation of existential > >> arithmetical statement are independent of me, you, or the existence > >> or > >> not of a material world. > > > There is no usual interpretation, it is disputed. > > For set theoretical realism. Not for the natural numbers. Yes, for natural numbers. Even the existence of the number one is disputed among philosophers > I mean > nobody, except you and ultrafinitist, doubt about the mathematical > existence of natural numbers. They can doubt about deeper existence of > those numbers, but I am not using this. Are you criticizing all > theories using natural numbers (from economy to physics)?. As I have pointed out endlessly, I think the standard backwads-E statements of arithmetic are *true* , I just don't think backwards-E *means* ontological existence. > > Formalists don't > > think > > backeards-E has any existential implications at all > > Formalist does not believe in primary matter either. I think most of them do. That claim requires some support at least. > And they do > believe in formal systems, which *doesn't* mean immaterial systems. Formal systems exist in mathematician's brain, books, and blackboards for materialists+formalists. >which have sense only through naïve > arithmetic. This dodge the issue, nevertheless, because you can add > "formal" to all existential quantifier in the reasoning without > changing the conclusion: formal physics has to be reduced to formal > number theory. It does change the conclusions. If the UD does not exist immaterially, or materially, it does not exist, and therefore I and physics are not being simulated on it. You cannot valldly derive an existential conclusion without making existential assumptions. > >> Would the two cosmic branes never have collided, and the big bang > >> never occurred, the Rieman hypothesis would still be atemporally and > >> aspatially true or false. > > > Truth and falsehood don't buy you an immaterial computer simulating me > > and eveything I see. > > Fortunately numbers and math are still free. If CTM is correct, you > are emulated infinitely often in the UD*. It exists (mathematically) > like PI and square-root of two. Which is to say, it does not really exist at all, and is merely said to exist in a formal game. > >>>> Get the feeling you have change your mind on AR. You believe that a > >>>> proposition like the statement that there is no biggest prime > >>>> number > >>>> has something to do with physics. In which physical theory you > >>>> prove > >>>> that statement, and how? > > >>> Its truth is not a physical truth. The existence or non-existence > >>> asserted is not any kind of real existence > > >> OK, in your theory "real existence" = "physical existence". > > > There are two claim here: > > > "real existence" = "physical existence". > > and > > "mathemaical existence" != "real existence". > > > they are argued separately. > > Please, define "real". ITSIAR > >> But if the > >> UDA is valid it would be better to write "consensual reality" = > >> "physical reality", and ontic or basic 3- existence = arithmetical > >> existence, or to abandon CTM. If UDA is non valid, it would be nice > >> to > >> point where is the error. You said that the error is in step 0, > >> because I would have pretended something like "the number seven > >> actually exists". My answer is that I don't see where I say so. I > >> just > >> say that the number seven exists, in the sense used by > >> mathematicians. > >> I limit my "platonism" to arithmetic to avoid the problem of > >> "platonism" in set theory or analysis, and the CTM explains why > >> realism on natural numbers in both necessary and sufficient. > > >>> I am not denying nay truths, only the interpretation of backwards-E > >>> as actual existence > > >> I am using a fairly common notion of mathematical existence, > > > There is no common notion, the ontology of maths is not > > a settled issue > > The ontology of math is not settled, sure, but this does not prevent a > common agreement, notably on the mathematical existence of natural > numbers. What you are referring to is agreement amongst mathematicians about which backwards-E statements to accept. That is quite different form agreement amongst philosophers about the ontological status of numbers. > >> and I > >> explain that once you say yes to the doctor, the notion of physical > >> existence has to be reduced to that common notion of mathematical > >> existence (actually a tiny part of arithmetical existence). > > >> Up to now, the only things you criticize in the UD reasoning are > >> things *you* are introducing, > > > In the sense that your Platonism is largley implict, > > and needs to be made explicit.. > > Where? Everywhere except where I was able to quote you admitting to it. > >> and when I remark to you that it is not > >> there, you say, it is implicit, but fail to show me where those > >> implicit statement have been used. Then you change the meaning of > >> "platonism" at every post. You define a criterium of "real" (RITSIAR) > >> without ever saying if the "I" is the third person body (which we can > >> doubt the existence) or the first person consciousness (which we > >> cannot doubt, but can't communicate). > > > From the materialist POV, the difference isn't important. > > >> You said that the difference is > >> epistemological, but that does not answer the question. > >> You said once that you accept mathematical truth, and then that the > >> number seven does not exist AT ALL. > > > YES!!!!! IT IS A WELL KNOWN POSITION CALLED FORMALISM!!!!! > > > It is not some absurdity I just invented. > > I was pointing that you have said successively > - the number seven exists only mathematically > - the number seven does not exist at all YES!!!! Formalism means: mathematical existence == non-existence ontologically. > Those are contradictory statements. No! It is not a contradiction to say Sherlock Holes lived in Baker street, and Sherlock Holmes was not real at all. One is true within a "game", the other is true full stop. > >> You compare mathematical object with fictional character in fairy > >> tales! > > > That's another well-know position called ficitonalism > > >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ > > There are degrees of fictionalism. > Strong fictionalism claim that "7 is prime" is false. > Weak fictionalism still agree that "7 is prime" has most of its usual > mathematical meaning. This is enough for the reasoning to proceed. A > weak fictionalist can accept CT. > No mathematician are strong fictionnalist. It is an idea of > philosopher only. I accept that the UD reasoning does not work for a > strong fictionnalist, but this should be obvious from CT. Weak fictionalism does not buy you an actual, RITSIAR UD. > >> Do you really think that an arithmetician could write "Once > >> upon a time there was an odd number dreaming becoming an even > >> number ...". > > > That isn't what I wrote. What I wrote was that there are sentences > > which are a) true and b) mention the word "exists" but in which > > "exsts" is not meant to be taken literally. > > When discussing fundamental science, no use of the word "exist" should > be taken literally. Fine. Then I am not literally being simulated by an immateial UD. > >> It would help much more if you were able to say "I don't understand > >> this or that in the reasoning, and give explicit reference to the > >> paper or posts". > > > The argumetn I am actually making is that your arguemnt is either > > invalid or has an imiplict premise. How am I supposed ot > > point to an implicit premise. > > By pointing on a step in the reasoning where you think I am using that > implicit premise. That's where you tell me I am being simulated by an immaterial UD > Bruno --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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