On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:59, Flammarion wrote:

> On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
>>> On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>>>>> Can't matter have processes?
>>>> But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
>>>> matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
>>>> propertyless. How something without property can implement  
>>>> processes,
>>>> with or without qualia?
>>> PM has no essential properties, but is the bearer of all
>>> otther properties.
>> How could something without property be a bearer of property?
> How can you write on blank paper?

Because blank paper has the property of retaining ink, being stable on  
my desk.

>>> It can implement a computation in just
>>> the same way it can be red.
>> How ?
> By bearing properties

How ?

>> Without properties, I don't see how it could implement a computation.
> It can bear the propreties of any physical coputer you care to
> mention.
>>> (Althoguh the combinatin PM+red
>>> is of course not PM. It is only PM as a bare substrate).
>>>> I begin to think that your primary matter is even incompatible with
>>>> physicalism.
>>> !!!!
>> Could you give any reference of a text in physics which uses the
>> notion of primary matter?
>> Could you give just a physical fact or proposition which would
>> accredit the existence of primary matter?
>> What is the relation between primary matter and space, time, and
>> energy? Does primary matter have mass?
> Mass is a property. But the existence of conserved
> quantities is a clue to PM. PM must be endduring because
> it has not proeprties to change.
> Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
> may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
> dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
> matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer is that
> not all bundles of posible properties are instantiated, that they
> exist.

In which theory?

> What does it mean to say something exists ? "..exists" is a meaningful
> predicate of concepts rather than things.

I could agree with that. But concept are typically non material.

> The thing must exist in some
> sense to be talked about.

"in some sense". Sure. No need to restricted oneself on a speculative  
ontological sense.

> But if it existed full, a statement like
> "Nessie doesn't exist" would be a contradiction ...it would amount to
> "the existing thing Nessie doesnt exist". However, if we take that the
> "some sense" in which the subject of an "...exists" predicate exists
> is only initially as a concept, we can then say whether or not the
> concept has something to refer to. Thus "Bigfoot exists" would mean
> "the concept 'Bigfoot' has a referent".
> What matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence.

No, it is "physical existence", you usually mean, and this does not  
work, or there is an error in MGA.

> A non-
> existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility.
> Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of
> contingency or "somethingism" -- the idea that only certain possible
> things exist.

Yes, that is my favorite definition of matter, quite close to Plotinus  
'Platonist correction' of Aristotle.
Yet, with comp, and actually with quantum mechanics, such existence  
are necessarily relative.
No need, and no possibility of using such matter for justifying the  
"absolute bearer of contingency" (as your PM is).

You look like the Bohmian of comp (and take this as a compliment).  
Like Bohm you add something, PM, to select a reality, where comp  
explain how the selection has to be done by the observer only.

> The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to
> be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in
> something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain
> properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it
> becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change;
> since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate
> cannot itself change and must endure through change. In more detail
> here

Anyway, I was hoping to be able to guess where your PM would  
jeopardize the movie-graph, because I have no clue.
You may consider this: you have not yet told anyone at which line of  
MGA you have a problem with. You just repeat vague statement according  
to which there is something implicit, like the ontological existence  
of a UD, and don't answer my question of where such ontological  
existence is used in the reasoning.

I could give bad notes to my students just by telling them that their  
work is full of invisible faults. Easy!



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