On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on > > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't > > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind > > on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to > > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably > > be founded on CTM > > coupled with Platonism.
With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point. What Bruno has demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8 shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very virtuality*. Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous. Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not RITSIAR=platonic. Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous. But this is the value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible theoretical conjunctions. David > On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: > > > >> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM > > >> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the > > >> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on > > >> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion > > >> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role. > > > > No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting > > > forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated > > > on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low > > > likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me > > > to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is > > > real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish > > > between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge. > > > Well, the either the Olympia/MGA reductios entail this consequence, or > > they don't. You imply that they don't, but you still haven't put > > forward a clear refutation in a fully explicit form that could be > > considered here on its merits. > > No-one's put forward a clear statement of it either. > > > Until you can do this, it isn't a > > question of certain or good-enough knowledge, but rather about the > > logical entailment of CTM itself. > > It's about both. It can have entail possibilities that > are very unlikely. > > > This is an extremely non-trivial > > point: the burden of the argument is that CTM entails a reversal in > > world-view; it is fundamentally incompatible with a materialist > > metaphysics. > > > > BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of > > > a smaller material universe? > > > That is a tenable view. But not with the simultaneous assumption of > > CTM. > > Because? > > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on > > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't > > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind > > on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to > > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably > > be founded on CTM > > coupled with Platonism. > > > David --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---