On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
> > > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> > > on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to
> > > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
> > > be founded on CTM
> > coupled with Platonism.
> With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point. What Bruno has
> demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
> shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
> virtuality*. Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous.
There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
If there is nothing at the bottom
of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
> Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
Possible X => actually X
is a fallacy.
> Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
> virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous. But this is the
> value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
> choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
> theoretical conjunctions.
No incompatibility has been demonstrated.
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