2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>> > >That is the point.  I should say that my starting position
>> > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
>> > > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process.  Bruno hasn't
>> > > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
>> > > on some such basis is actually untenable.  But he has awakened me to
>> > > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
>> > > be founded on CTM
>>
>> > coupled with Platonism.
>>
>> With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point.  What Bruno has
>> demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
>> shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
>> virtuality*.  Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous.
>
> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> If there is nothing at the bottom
> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.

There's no bottom. Why would you need one ? It's turtle all the way down !

The bottom of the stack is a *relative* notion.

>> Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
>> RITSIAR=platonic.
>
> CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> that
> Possible X => actually X
> is a fallacy.
>
>> Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
>> virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous.  But this is the
>> value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
>> choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
>> theoretical conjunctions.
>
> No incompatibility has been demonstrated.
> >
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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