On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:

> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>> That is the point.  I should say that my starting position
>>>> before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of  
>>>> CTM on
>>>> the basis of any consistent notion of physical process.  Bruno  
>>>> hasn't
>>>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of  
>>>> mind
>>>> on some such basis is actually untenable.  But he has awakened me  
>>>> to
>>>> the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can  
>>>> tenably
>>>> be founded on CTM
>>> coupled with Platonism.
>> With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point.  What Bruno has
>> demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
>> shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
>> virtuality*.  Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous.
> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> If there is nothing at the bottom
> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
>> Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
>> RITSIAR=platonic.
> CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> that
> Possible X => actually X
> is a fallacy.

So you have a problem with the indexical approach of time, and space.  
Of course it is the milk of the everything-list basic idea. And MGA,  
certainly not just MGA, shows that comp entails the indexical  
approach. Actually X is indeed just consistent X "as seen from inside".

>> Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
>> virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous.  But this is the
>> value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
>> choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
>> theoretical conjunctions.
> No incompatibility has been demonstrated.

Given the references to text and posts, we are still waiting a  
justification of this statement.
A scientist would say: your going from this line to this line is  
invalid for this reason.


> >


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