On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>>>>>> That is the point.  I should say that my starting position
>>>>>> before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of  
>>>>>> CTM on
>>>>>> the basis of any consistent notion of physical process.  Bruno  
>>>>>> hasn't
>>>>>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of  
>>>>>> mind
>>>>>> on some such basis is actually untenable.  But he has awakened  
>>>>>> me to
>>>>>> the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can  
>>>>>> tenably
>>>>>> be founded on CTM
>>
>>>>> coupled with Platonism.
>>
>>>> With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point.  What Bruno  
>>>> has
>>>> demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
>>>> shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
>>>> virtuality*.  Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be  
>>>> vacuous.
>>
>>> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
>>> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
>>> If there is nothing at the bottom
>>> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
>>
>> There's no bottom. Why would you need one ? It's turtle all the way  
>> down !
>
> That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an ontological
> commitment.


No, it is the same arithmetical truth, but from the first person  
perspective. For this you need step seven + step eight.
You have not yet answer to the question about step seven I ask  
yesterday.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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