On 1 Sep, 16:32, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> > wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> > If there is nothing at the bottom
> > of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
>
> Yes, it sounds logically compelling when you put it like that, doesn't
> it?  But the entailment of CTM - and this is why it's so important for
> you to clarify your objections to this - is that there is nothing that
> can be said about "the bottom of the stack" that is not vacuous with
> respect to computational theory.

That just amounts to saying that you can't prove with
certainty that you are not beign virtualised. I have
taken that on board all along. I can still say with
high probability that I am not virtualised. The point
you and Bruno keep missing is that there is no
priam facie evidence of any UD or stack. I do not
have to argue myself "out" of it., just note that
there is no evidence I am in it. in the first place.

All my argument requires is

1) Occam's razor
2) the observation that there are infintiely many sceptical hypotheses
3) the observation that there is no evidence for any of them.

i do *not* need specific evidence that I am not being virtualised,
just 1)..3)

> CTM forces us to face the issue of
> the incompatibility of what we think we want out of an ontology, and
> what we can actually get on the basis of a given theory.  CTM forces
> you - by Occam - to disregard any effects of a non-virtual ontology.

No it doesn't. Without the assumption of Platonism there is
no reason to believe in a UD or other virtualisation device
exists in the first place. I can't be certain I am not virtualised,
but it is unlikely. So I can continue beleiving in a materist ontology
as the likelisest option.

> Beyond this, there's nothing to stop you making an additional claim
> that it must nonetheless supervene on 'real matter' in order to be
> really real.  But in that case, after the application of the razor,
> it's you who are invoking pixies.

If it's not resting on matter, it's restign on numbers, and why
shouildn't the razor apply to them?

> If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
> it the notion of a virtual ontology.  This is so clear cut that I
> would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
> it or refute it with precise counter-argument.  Which is it to be?

You have slipped into Bruno's habit of confusing CTM with comp.

comp=CTM+Platonism.

If I reject Platonism, I can keep
CTM and still reject the virtualsiation claim as lacking likelihood.
Having done that. I should believe I am running on the metal as that
is the simplest ontology.

> > > Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
> > > RITSIAR=platonic.
>
> > CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> > I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> > that
> > Possible X => actually X
> > is a fallacy.
>
> CTM does not only suggest this, it forces the conclusion, or else
> collapses.  Saying no to the doctor implies either that you distrust
> his command of theory or praxis, or alternatively that you don't
> believe in CTM - this is still your option.

Yes doctor doesn't mean I actually am virtualised, only
that I can't tell *for sure* that I am not. However I can stil
be 99% sure I am not. The vanishingly small possibility
that I am wrong should not affect my jugements -- unlike Occam's
razor.

>This is such a crucial
> point that at this stage ISTM that it requires either clear acceptance
> on the basis of truth, or clear refutation on the basis of error.
> AFAICS these discussions are absolutely pointless on any other basis.



> > > Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
> > > virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous.  But this is the
> > > value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
> > > choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
> > > theoretical conjunctions.
>
> > No incompatibility has been demonstrated.
>
> Well, I and others have argued at some length that it has, and Bruno
> in particular has argued with great precision that it has.  The floor
> is yours.

Bruno argues with immense detail *from* his Platonist premise,
but he barely  defends the premise itself.

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