David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
>   
>>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
>>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM.  The razor is then applied on the
>>> basis of that assumption.  If you prefer a theory of mind based on
>>> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
>>> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>>>       
>> No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
>> forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
>> on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
>> likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
>> to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
>> real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
>> between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
>>     
>
> Well, the either the Olympia/MGA reductios entail this consequence, or
> they don't.  You imply that they don't, but you still haven't put
> forward a clear refutation in a fully explicit form that could be
> considered here on its merits.  Until you can do this, it isn't a
> question of certain or good-enough knowledge, but rather about the
> logical entailment of CTM itself.  

First, as I understand it, MGA shows that computation realizing 
consciousness could be instantiated with almost zero physical 
component.  Since a reductio argument only entails that something in the 
inferences or premises is wrong, it is not shown that consciousness can 
be realized by computation in Platonia.  And, second, even if that were 
shown it would not follow that consciousness *is* realized by 
computation in Platonia.  Of course then Bruno challenges us to point to 
the particular step of his argument that is in error.  I suspect it has 
to do with the context or environment and the error is in supposing that 
consciousness can be separated from interaction with an external world.  
We're pretty sure that it can be for short periods of time, but as I 
recall from sensory deprivation experiments in the '70s consciousness 
goes into an endless loop after about an hour without input.  I'm not 
sure what the implications of this are for computationalism.  It 
certainly still allows that one might say "Yes." to the doctor.  But it 
may invalidate the idea that the world is just conscious computations in 
Platonia because the world in total is probably not computable.

Which is not to say I don't find Bruno's argument interesting as a 
possible model of the multiverse.  If QM can be based on a UD  that 
would be very interesting.

Brent

> This is an extremely non-trivial
> point: the burden of the argument is that CTM entails a reversal in
> world-view; it is fundamentally incompatible with a materialist
> metaphysics.
>
>   
>> BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
>> a smaller material universe?
>>     
>
> That is a tenable view.  But not with the simultaneous assumption of
> CTM.  That is the point.  I should say that my starting position
> before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> the basis of any consistent notion of physical process.  Bruno hasn't
> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> on some such basis is actually untenable.  But he has awakened me to
> the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
> be founded on CTM
>
> David
>
>   
>>
>> On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>     
>>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>>
>>>       
>>>>> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
>>>>> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
>>>>> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>>>>>           
>>>> Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
>>>> that we are 1 level deep, 2 levels deep... in  a virtualisation.
>>>>         
>>>> Real reality is the simplest assumption
>>>>         
>>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
>>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM.  The razor is then applied on the
>>> basis of that assumption.  If you prefer a theory of mind based on
>>> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
>>> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>>>       
>> No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
>> forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
>> on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
>> likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
>> to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
>> real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
>> between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
>>
>> BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
>> a smaller material universe?
>>
>>     
>
> >
>
>   


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