2009/9/1 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>
>>
>>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
>>> physics.
>>>
>>
>> It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
>> argument is against CTM+PM.  AFAICS nobody is claiming that the
>> assumption of CTM is *forced* by the computability of physics,
>> although the contrary would of course argue against it.  Rather, *once
>> CTM is assumed* the entailment on the basis of UDA-8 is that PM is
>> false, or at best superfluous.  If we can't get past this point, we're
>> doomed to go round in circles.
>>
>>
>>> The CTM does indeed have hypotetical implciations about
>>> virtualisation, but nothing follows from that. There is no
>>> implication from "I might be virtualised" to "I am virtualised" any
>>> more than from "I might be  BIV.."
>>>
>>
>> On the contrary, the insight that Bruno points out is that the force
>> of CTM consists precisely in the *assumption* that "I am virtualised";
>> else it has no force.  This is the point.  UDA-8 is then designed to
>> expose the entailment that "my generalised environment is virtualised"
>> is thereby also forced.  Consequently the CTM is forced to be a theory
>> of mind-body, or else nothing.
>
> How did we get from a hypothetical that "I am virtualised" to something
> being *forced*?  This is like saying "I might be virtualised" entails "I
> must be virtualised".
>
> Brent
>

I don't see it this way...

The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). Level 0 plays no
role.
So I see no points in positing one in the first place. Simulation is
relative to an UTM not to an innaccessible substrate.

Quentin


>
>
> >
>



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