On 31 Aug, 21:31, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:31, Flammarion wrote:
> > On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
> >>> On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
> >>>>> 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or
> >>>>> generated
> >>>>> by something else that does
> >>>>> 2. I ontologically exist
> >>>>> 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
> >>>>> 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist.
> >>>>> Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards
> >>>>> to here
> >>>> 5. But the UD exists only mathematically.
> >>>> Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence.
> >>>>> There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology
> >>>>> of mathematics.
> >>>> For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a
> >>>> general mathematical agreement.
> >>> No there isn't.
> >> What is the disagreement?
> > The age old debate about whether numbers exist
> You confuse the use of number in physics, and in cognitive science,
> and in computer science, with metaphysical discussion I do avoid. When
> I say that there is no disagreement about the numbers, I mean that
> most scientist agree on the use of the classical tautologies in
> arithmetic. Nothing more. Or show me where.
tautologies don't buy you a UD. Unicorns=unicorns doesn;t mean
there are any unicorns.
> >>>> There may be no philosophical
> >>>> argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non
> >>>> philosophical
> >>>> reasoning.
> >>> Ontology is philosophy. You can't settle ontological quesitons
> >>> with mathematical proofs.
> >> Philosophy, or theology. OK. But comp is an assumption in cognitive-
> >> science/philosophy/theology.
> > No. *CTM* is. "Comp* is your own fusion of CTM with
> > Platonism
> Comp is CTM + "2+2 is equal to 4 or 2+2 is not equal to 4".
AR qua truth does nto buy you a UD either
> Wait I explain CT, you will see what I mean more easily.
> >> It is an assumption that a form of
> >> reincarnation is possible.
> >> This is not pure mathematics. UDA belongs
> >> to the intersection of cognitive and physic science. UDA is not
> >> purely
> >> mathematical.
> > It is not going anywhere without some ontological
> > assumptions either. since it has an ontological conclusion.
> I am using the hypothesis that my consciousness will be relatively
> preserved by a transformation of my brain, and Church thesis. And the
> conclusion is epistemological: comp -> physics is a branch of number
> theory, but with a gift: that physics is part of a larger thing (and
> splits into qualia and quanta). I don't make publicly ontological
> commitment. I give a theory, theorems, and a practical way to test the
> consequence of the theory.
The fact that you don't majke your ontological assumptions
explicit is just the problem.
> >>>>> You are aware. are you not, that philosophers
> >>>>> and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking
> >>>>> and defending Platonism and other approaches?
> >>>> Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as
> >>>> something
> >>>> far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all
> >>>> mathematicians agree.
> >>> I am not concerned with argument about how many pixies exist.
> >> So a doubt about the existence of a large cardinal in set theory rise
> >> a doubt about the existence of seven?
> > No. A doubt about the ontological existence of seven leads
> > to a doubt about the rest.
> A doubt on seven, would destroy the argument. Indeed!
> I personally don't believe in ontological seven, as far as I can make
> a sense on that.
Well, if the UD isn't ontological either, I am not being simulated on
> >> I have use arithmetical realism, because I have never met any
> >> difficulty, among mathematicians, physicians and computer scientist.
> >> Nor even with philosophers, except some which just dodge the issues
> >> of
> >> showing what they miss in the argument.
> > Hmm. Well, you would say that, wouldn't you.
> I was thinking of you, and some old "friends". But at least, you make
> the dodging in public, my "friends" never did. I thank you for that.
> >> My work has been indeed rejected in Brussels, by philsophers. But it
> >> has been defended a s a PhD thesis by a jury with mathematician,
> >> computer scientist, physician (yes, not physicist, but doctor!).
> > But it is a philosophical thesis, since its conclusion is the nature
> > of existence.
> Not at all. I see the bigness of the misunderstanding here. I just use
> the scientific way to proceed in theology.
Theology is philosophy and then some
> This is what I like with the Church Turing thesis, it makes possible
> to keep the agnostic scientific attitude in very deep question, and to
> proceed by theories and verification, and this in a field that
> atheists like to relegate to religious crackpot.
> Atheists and other religious fundamentailist hates this work, but that
> is normal. My work shows atheism and some religion are very close
> compared to the abysse between atheism and agnosticism (be it on mind,
> matter, god, or whatever).
> Is that the problem?
> >>> The point remains: there *is* a debate so there is *not* a standard
> >>> ontology.
> >>>> It is believed explcitly by many physicists too,
> >>>> like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in
> >>>> physics.
> >>> I never said no-on beliieves Platonism. I said some
> >>> people belive other things. Therefore it is contentious,
> >>> therefore it is needs jsutification.
> >> It is more efficacious to see if the consequence of comp, believed by
> >> many, are verified by nature.
> > It's the consequences of CTM+Platonism
> For once, that would not change the point. But it is *just* CTM, and
> to define CTM properly, you need CT, and thus you need that minimal
> form of arithmetical realism, just to accept that a machine stop or
> does not stop, in principle.
That's just bivalence, not any metaphysical realism
> That is all I need. I need consciousness for the yes doctor, and I
> show that physics resume to numbers relation, as some physicists
> already agree, but for different reasons. Here, we have something
> more. The reduction of physics to numbers goes through machine's
> epistemology, and this is nice because I get the quanta with the
> qualia, and their as complete as possible mathematics.
If the machine does not exist its "epsitemology" can't be generating
physics minds or anything else.
> >>>>>> By comp, the ontic
> >>>>>> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can
> >>>>>> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson
> >>>>>> Arithmetic
> >>>>>> is already enough.
> >>>>> I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist.
> >>>> This may be the root of your problem.
> >>>>>> comp = CTM.
> >>>>> It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in
> >>>>> your SANE paper.
> >>>> All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 = 4".
> >>> Nope, mere truth does not buy the immaterial existence of a UD
> >> But from "2+2 = 4" and CT, you can derive the existence of UD.
> > Only the mathematical existence.
> Just what I need, to explain why machine, existing only
> mathematically, will correctly believe in the limit that what they
> called consciousness and why observable matter comes from the
> impossible marriage of addition and multiplication.
Only existig things believe. If mathematical existence=non-existence,
nothing follows about my reality.
> >>>>> Classical logic is just a formal rule.
> >>>> It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In
> >>>> computer science people admit that a running program will either
> >>>> halt,
> >>>> or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use
> >>>> of
> >>>> classical logic.
> >>> It still does not demonstrate the immaterial existence of computers
> >>> no-one has built.
> >> No one has ever build the prime numbers.
> > No. They were not built. they did not spontaneously spring
> > into being, they do not exist at all.
> To one comment to another one, you contradict yourself.
> Above you agree that the UD, and the prime numbers I presume, exists
> in the mathematical sense, and now you say that prime numbers does not
> exists at all.
I have consistently maintained that mathematical "existence"
is nothign ontologically, any more than Sherlock Holmes'
"existence" is late vitorian London. Is it so hard to grasp
that a word can have different meaning in different contexts?
> Do or do not the UD and prime numbers exists in the mathematical sense?
Sure. But that is fictive. Since real people do not srping from the
of books. I am not springing from a merely mathematically existing UD.
> >>>>> Bivalence is not Platonism
> >>>> Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully
> >>>> "arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and
> >>>> Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology).
> >>> Even more reason to distinguish between AR qua truth and AR qua
> >>> existence.
> >> Yes, and I use only AR qua truth.
> > Then you cannot come to any valid conclusion about my existence.
> Yes I can, once you say yes to the doctor. It is the whole point of UDA
The UDA can have no point unless the UD really exists.
> And you exists, indeed, but not materially. You are not made from
> *substantial* particles nor waves, particles are made of infinities of
> numbers relations, classified by group theory and white rabbits
> "renormalization", in the CTM at least.
> >> I may ask you what are your evidence for a primary matter, or for
> >> your
> >> notion of AR qua physical existence.
> > You dismiss matterial existence assuming Platonic existence.
> No, I assume material existence to show it epistemologically
> contradictory by a reductio ad absurdo.
Without Platonic existence. there is no UD, and nothing
follows from the UDA
> > I dismiss Platonic existene assuming material existence.
> I don't know what you mean by platonic existence. You certainly don't
> dismiss the idea that classical logic can be used on arithmetical
> propositions, are you?
No. I mean immaterial existence. Somehting exists and it it is't
material (as you say) then it is immaterial. It is up to you to
the explanation of immaterial existence, since I don;t beleive in it.
> > I may not have a proof, but neither do you.
> I propose a proof, and it looks like you don't have read it, because
> you stop at step 0, by using a critics which is irrelevant up to step
> 7, and defeated by step 8. If you read it, tell me where you have the
> feeling that I am wrong.
You can'ty pull out your UD at step 7 withiout justifiying Platonism
at step 0.
> From what I understand, only step 8 should be addressed by you. It is
> the place where *primitive matter* is made non sensical in machine 's
The machine does nto exist, so it has no beliefs.
>Physicalism is incompatible with CTM, that is the
> result. If it is wrong, let me known where the error has been made. I
> am far to pretend no error could be found, but up to now, scientist
> don't find it, and some philosophers dodge the issue. (Thanks to David
> for having taught me the word "dodge" :)
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