David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
> on:
>> OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
>> specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
>> physically and not therefore part of the HP and not
>> therefore of much philosophical interest.
> I agree that this is not part of the HP.  It is however highly
> relevant to the grain issue and the apparent conscious-unconscious
> dichotomy, which are two of the things you have been pressing me on.
> Hence given such relevance I can hardly agree that it lacks
> philosophical interest.
>>>  By the way, if you have a
>>> simple extrinsic account of the phenomena of the specious present, I'd
>>> be genuinely interested in more detail.
>> I think I gave one. Slow communications in the brain=short term
>> information storage=specious present
>> You could hardly *not* have one.
> Yes, I thought this was probably what you had in mind.  This is what I
> meant by the assumption of a simple traverse through time, and hence
> your proposal is at odds with either flux or block models of time.
> The "slow communications" you refer to, under the flux interpretation,
> would simply decompose into multiple slices, which taken individually
> could not plausibly constitute the specious present.  Hence "short
> term information storage" outside such individual slices already
> presupposes some form of integration 'through time' - i.e. across
> slices.  This points to the fact that there is something deeply
> counter intuitive about our actual experience of the 'present moment'
> with respect to either of the standard temporal analyses.
> My strong suspicion (and be clear I'm not putting it any higher than
> this) is that the same mechanism that synthesises and presents
> integrated temporal experience (think of melody as opposed to pitch)
> is also central to the qualitative aspect of self-conscious states.
> IOW there's something going on that both integrates and differentiates
> the internal worlds we inhabit, in this characteristic way, that is
> not analysable in terms of simple linear process through the standard
> time dimension of physics.  

There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's 
not analyzable in terms of physics.  I've experienced  non-integrated 
perceptions a few times.  When something completely unexpected or 
unfamiliar happens that involves sound and sight it becomes noticeable 
that sounds are processed by the brain quicker than are sights - which 
would be expected on simple information content grounds.  Ordinarily 
your brain coordinates the sights and sounds and you are not conscious 
of this difference.  But for something really unfamiliar and unexpected 
you get a confusion of hearing things "out of sync" with sights which 
you, on reflection, later realize where aspects of the same event.


> I would also suspect that this is relevant
> to why qualia have been so elusive on the basis of such analyses.  The
> basic 'temporal' notion bears some family resemblance to ideas such as
> Barbour's time capsules, although in discussion he did not commit
> definitively on the precise relationship between this conception and
> the full duration of the specious present.
> David

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