On 01 Sep 2009, at 19:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the
>>> computability of
>> It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
>> argument is against CTM+PM. AFAICS nobody is claiming that the
>> assumption of CTM is *forced* by the computability of physics,
>> although the contrary would of course argue against it. Rather,
>> CTM is assumed* the entailment on the basis of UDA-8 is that PM is
>> false, or at best superfluous. If we can't get past this point,
>> doomed to go round in circles.
>>> The CTM does indeed have hypotetical implciations about
>>> virtualisation, but nothing follows from that. There is no
>>> implication from "I might be virtualised" to "I am virtualised" any
>>> more than from "I might be BIV.."
>> On the contrary, the insight that Bruno points out is that the force
>> of CTM consists precisely in the *assumption* that "I am
>> else it has no force. This is the point. UDA-8 is then designed to
>> expose the entailment that "my generalised environment is
>> is thereby also forced. Consequently the CTM is forced to be a
>> of mind-body, or else nothing.
> How did we get from a hypothetical that "I am virtualised" to
> being *forced*? This is like saying "I might be virtualised"
> entails "I
> must be virtualised".
I agree, the hypothetical in CTM or comp is "I will survive if I am
virtualized in such machine at that level". It is the "yes doctor".
That we are, mind and body, virtualized is the consequence of the
reasoning. With a stronger Occam, we can get free of the need of MGA
in UDA, though.
That we are virtualized in arithmetic, is the consequence of taking
seriously the comp hyp. This makes comp verifiable experimentally, and
actually already verified in the sense that if QM did not exist, and
physical observable be classical, we would knew already that comp is
false. Verified in the Popper sense, thus.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at