David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>> If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
>>> it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
>>> would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
>>> it or refute it with precise counter-argument. Which is it to be?
>> You have slipped into Bruno's habit of confusing CTM with comp.
> I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
> but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
> postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
> and hence in principle implementable by any physical process capable
> of instantiating the equivalent computation. Bruno's 'version' starts
> with this postulate and then shows that the first part of the
> hypothesis - i.e. that the mind is computational - is incompatible
> with the second part - i.e. that it is implemented by some
> specifically distinguishable non-computational process.
That's the step I don't grasp. I see that the MGA makes it plausible
that the mind could be a computation divorced from all physical
processes - but not that it must be. Maybe you can explain it.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at