David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>
>   
>>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>>> change *within* such capsules.  And if we argue that this change isn't
>>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>>> successive capsules through time, and then we're either appealing to
>>> data that's no longer accessible at the time it's supposed to be
>>> efficacious, or we've flipped into a block view.  So it seems like
>>> there's something missing in our conception of how experiential time
>>> could translate from the physical to the psychological and vice versa,
>>> because it seems we can't help appealing to both quasi-flux and
>>> quasi-block models to save the appearances.
>>>
>>>       
>> Bertrand Russell wrote a paper in which he took short durations,
>> "moments", as basic and showed that the time of physics could be derived
>> from the overlap of moments.
>>     
>
> That's interesting, but what does "the overlap of moments" mean?
>
> David
>   
It means that it is false that either one wholly precedes the other.  
The paper which was originally in Proc Cambridge Phil Soc Mar 1936, but 
it is reprinted in "Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950"

Brent

>
>
>   
>> David Nyman wrote:
>>     
>>> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>>>> There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
>>>> not analyzable in terms of physics.
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
>>> present is very odd in the face of either the flux or block view of
>>> time in physics.  Introspection convinces us (me anyway) that there is
>>> some psychologically significant duration beyond the momentary that is
>>> indispensable to sensory experience (think of how we grasp melodies as
>>> opposed to pitch).  On a physical analysis of the brain, we clearly
>>> cannot argue under the flux approach for any influence that isn't
>>> actually present within any given moment as having any relevance to
>>> experiential content, so we're forced to assume some sort of
>>> physically-structured 'temporal' encapsulation of multiple snapshots,
>>> of more than momentary total duration, that relies on the
>>> incorporation of memory of what's just past.
>>>
>>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>>> change *within* such capsules.  And if we argue that this change isn't
>>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>>> successive capsules through time, and then we're either appealing to
>>> data that's no longer accessible at the time it's supposed to be
>>> efficacious, or we've flipped into a block view.  So it seems like
>>> there's something missing in our conception of how experiential time
>>> could translate from the physical to the psychological and vice versa,
>>> because it seems we can't help appealing to both quasi-flux and
>>> quasi-block models to save the appearances.
>>>
>>>       
>> Bertrand Russell wrote a paper in which he took short durations,
>> "moments", as basic and showed that the time of physics could be derived
>> from the overlap of moments.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>     
>
> >
>
>   


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