On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:
>
> > But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
> > relations.  That's why two physical implementations which are different
> > at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
> > higher level.  I see nothing incoherent is saying that two physically
> > different computers perform the same computation.  So if mental states
> > are certain kinds of computations (either physically realized or in
> > Platonia) they can be realized on different, i.e. non-invariant physical
> > processes.  What's incoherent about that?
>
> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
>   ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two.  If computation
> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
> indeed nothing problematic in saying that "two physically different
> computers perform the same computation".  We can understand what is
> meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any
> identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational).  But 'realisation' of
> such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant
> experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a
> supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism.

Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step?
(You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state
having exitence independent from its concrete physcial
isntantiations).

> The point of Bruno's
> argument is to force a choice between the attachment of experience to
> physical process or computation; but not both at the same time.

I see no problem with mental states attaching to phsycial processes
"via" the computaitons instantiated by them. AFAICS that is still CTM.
Since every instance of  a computation *is* an instance of a phsycial
process as well, there is no either/or.

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