On 3 Sep, 09:41, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/3 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 3 Sep, 01:26, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> 2009/9/2 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
> >> >> and is thus not any particular physical
> >> >> object.  A specific physical implementation is a token of that
> >> >> computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose
> >> >> physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to
> >> >> instantiate the relevant computational invariance.  Hence it is hard
> >> >> to see how a specific (invariant) example of an experiential state
> >> >> could be justified as being token-identical with all the different
> >> >> physical implementations of a computation.
>
> >> > I was right.
>
> >> > A mental type can be associated with a computational
> >> > type.
>
> >> > Any token of a mental type can be associated with a token
> >> > of the corresponding computational type.
>
> >> But what difference is that supposed to make?  The type association is
> >> implicit in what I was saying.  All you've said above is that it makes
> >> no difference whether one talks in terms of the mental type or the
> >> associated computational type because their equivalence is a posit of
> >> CTM.  And whether it is plausible that the physical tokens so picked
> >> out possess the causal efficacy presupposed by CTM is precisely what I
> >> was questioning.
>
> > question it then. what's the problem?
>
> >> >> But even on this basis it still doesn't seem possible to establish any
> >> >> consistent identity between the physical variety of the tokens thus
> >> >> distinguished and a putatively unique experiential state.
>
> >> > The variety of the physical implementations is reduced by grouping
> >> > them
> >> > as  equivalent computational types. Computation is abstract.
> >> > Abstraction is
> >> > ignoring irrelevant details. Ignoring irrelevant details establishes a
> >> > many-to-one relationship : many possible implementations of one mental
> >> > state.
>
> >> Again, that's not an argument - you're just reciting the *assumptions*
> >> of CTM, not arguing for their plausibility.
>
> > you're not arguing against its plausibility
>
> >> The justification of the
> >> supposed irrelevance of particular physical details is that they are
> >> required to be ignored for the supposed efficacy of the type-token
> >> relation to be plausible.  That doesn't make it so.
>
> > why not? we already know they can be ignored to establish
> > computational
> > equivalence.
>
> >> >>  On the
> >> >> contrary, any unbiased a priori prediction would be of experiential
> >> >> variance on the basis of physical variance.
>
> >> > Yes. The substance of the CTM claim is that physical
> >> > differences do not make  a mental difference unless they
> >> > make a computational difference. That is to say, switching from
> >> > one token of a type of computation to another cannot make
> >> > a difference in mentation. That is not to be expected on an
> >> > "unbiased" basis, just because it is a substantive claim.
>
> >> Yes it's precisely the claim whose plausibility I've been questioning.
>
> > You haven't said anything specific about what is wrong with it at all.
>
> >> > The variety of the physical implementations is reduced by grouping
> >> > them
> >> > as  equivalent computational types. Computation is abstract.
> >> > Abstraction is
> >> > ignoring irrelevant details. Ignoring irrelevant details establishes a
> >> > many-to-one relationship : many possible implementations of one mental
> >> > state.
>
> >> Yes thanks, this is indeed the hypothesis.  But simply recapitulating
> >> the assumptions isn't exactly an uncommitted assessment of their
> >> plausibility is it?
>
> > Saying it is not necessarily correct is not a critique
>
> >>That can only immunise it from criticism.  There
> >> is no whiff in CTM of why it should be considered plausible on
> >> physical grounds alone.
>
> >> Hence counter arguments can legitimately
> >> question the consistency of its claims as a physical theory in the
> >> absence of its type-token presuppositions.
>
> >  If you mean you can criticise the CTM as offering nothing specific
> > to resolve the HP, you are correct. But I *thought* we were
> > discussing the MG/Olympia style of argument, which purportedly
> > still applies even if you restrict yourself to cognition and forget
> > about experience/qualia.
> > Are we?
>
> >> Look, let me turn this round.  You've said before that you're not a
> >> diehard partisan of CTM.  What in your view would be persuasive
> >> grounds for doubting it?
>
> > I'll explain below. But the claim I am interested in is that CTM
> > somehow disproves materalism (Maudlin, BTW takes it the other way
> > around--
> > materialism disproves CTM). I have heard not a word in support of
> > *that* claim.
>
> > ust an Artificial Intellence be a Computer ?
>
> > An AI is not necessarily a computer. Not everything is a computer or
> > computer-emulable. It just needs to be artificial and intelligent!
>
> Then it's no more *CTM*. (C means Computational)

I know. I am not defending CTM against all-comers. I am trying to find
out why some people
think it is incompatible with mateialsim.

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