Dear Peter, the Yablo-Carnac-Gallois-Quine compendium is an interesting reading - except for missing the crux: You, as a person, with knowledge about the ideas of the bickering philosophers, could do us the politesse of a brief summary about "who is stating what" (very few lines) which may increase the understanding of the innocent by-reader about the generalities mentioned back and forth. I for one looked at the 2 URL-s, long as one of them may be, and found further generalities as in a style of scientifically 'expert' discussions/arguments.
I did not read so far and did not study these versions, so reading your (and their) papers was frustrating. I am fundamentally opposed to 'ontology', because I consider it explaining the partial knowledge we have about 'the world' as if it were the total. I am for epistemology, the growing information-staple we absorb. Most people stand on ontological grounds. I wanted to get a glimps. Could you help? John M On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 1:35 PM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > Yablo and Gallois's paper "Is ontology based on a mistake" is quite > relevant to > the question of Platonism, specificall whether true matehmatical > assertions > of existence have to be taken literally. > > http://tinyurl.com/ldekg7 > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > What is it? > > A paper criticising the Quinean view of ontology. Yablo does so by > introduces a metaphorical/literal distinction as to when it is > reasonable to posit the existence of entities. Thus in order to > determine our ontological commitments we need to be able to extract > all cases in which such entities are posited in a metaphorical way > rather than a literal one. If there is no way to do this, then it is > not possible to develop a Quinean ontology. > > Where does it fit in for me? > > For the thesis: if correct, it implies that Quine's fundamental > approach to ontology is flawed and this may have negative implications > for the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. > > For the metaphysics paper: possibly details a way in which existence > cannot be held to occur (which would be interesting to look at in > terms of the relations proposed). At the very least it gives an > example of particular existence claims which can then be analysed in a > relational way. > > Reference > Yablo, S., Does ontology rest on a mistake?, Proceedings of the > Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. LXXII (1998), 229-261. > > > The Argument > > Carnap on existence > Carnap argued that the realist existence question/assertion was > meaningless. He did this by means of his concept of linguistic > framework. A linguistic framework lays down rules for the use and > meaning of some object term X in a linguistic sense. Thus there are > two ways in which one can question/assert the existence of X: internal > or external to the linguistic framework. > > If one questions the existence of X internal to the framework, one is > almost certainly guaranteed a yes answer (thus the statement "there is > an X" can pretty much be viewed as tautological when assessed > internally to a framework involving X). Hence the realist must be > making an external existence assertion. However, in this case the term > X has no meaning, as the framework within which it gains such is not > present. Thus the realist existence question/assertion is either > tautological or impossible to answer/assess. > > Quine on Carnap > Quine objected to Carnap's position in three ways: firstly, he held > that his internal/external distinction was reliant on an analytic/ > synthetic distinction (because the concept of a linguistic framework > involves the rules inherent in that framework being viewed as > indefeasible (i.e. analytic) within that particular linguistic > practice). As Quine believed that the analytic/synthetic distinction > could not be made, he held that Carnap's internal/external distinction > breaks down: internal assessments are thus not just a matter of > following inviolable linguistic rules, it is indeed possible for these > rules to change in response to experience and thus for internal > practice to change too. > > Secondly, Quine argues that the external choice between linguistic > frameworks is much more influenced by observation than Carnap would > have us believe. For Quine, the decision to adopt a rule governing the > appropriate observational conditions under which one may assert the > existence of X is itself in part an assertion that X exists (if such > conditions obtain). He does not believe in making a distinction > between the linguistic truth and the factual truth of a statement. > > Finally, Quine objects to the claim that the choice of linguistic > framework existence rule is based on merely practical considerations > to do with efficiency, simplicity, etc with no metaphysical > implications. He does so on the basis that these are exactly the sorts > of things that scientists use to favour one theory (and hence in > Quine's opinion, a view of the world, complete with ontology) over > another. > > Yablo on Quine > Yablo argues that each aspect of Quine's critique is flawed. Firstly, > one does not need to hold that rules making up a linguistic framework > are analytic in order to be able to understand the need for a > framework in order to understand the meaning of terms. Not really sure > how this fits in and is related to Quine's second objection stage: One > does not need to render external talk of the objects within a > particular framework meaningless in order to save the internal, rule- > bound meaning. One can just make clear how such external statements > cannot be applied internally.;finally, Yablo points out that Quine > himself accepts the fact that a statement can be asserted purely for > practical advantage without the asserter actually holding that what it > entails metaphysically is actually the case. > > Saving the Framework > Yablo goes on to propose a linguistic framework modified in light of > Quine's criticisms in which a framework is adopted as a kind of "game" > where the players assess the truth and falsity of statements within > the framework without any belief in implications for truth and/or > falsity outside of the framework. Thus Yablo argues that there are two > ways in which a statement may be interpreted: literally (external to a > particular game or linguistic framework) or as a metaphor (internal). > > The Framework Strikes Back > This distinction regarding the way in which a statement may be > interpreted causes problems for the Quinean ontological regime. Given > that Quine does accept that assertions may be made in a metaphorical > sense, and that when one does so no ontological implications may be > drawn from such assertions, Quine needs to provide a clear demarcation > criterion to distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements. > As this has been much discussed without progress, it seems unlikely > that one will be able to distinguish between metaphorical and literal > usage and thus it is impossible to construct a certain ontology under > Quine's approach. > > Indeed, Yablo argues that for the most part when we make statements, > we are unsure as to whether they are strictly literally true or if > they are at least in part to be taken metaphorically. Thus the > Quiniean must argue that in time these metaphorical parts of our > statements will be eroded and eventually only the literal > interpretation will remain. However, this reduces the Quinean position > to the following: one should sympathise with the idea that Xs exist > iff the literal part of theories involve their postulation and one > should count the part of a theory that involves the postulation of Xs > literal iff there turn out to be Xs. Thus there is a circularity. > > Argument Outline > > * Carnap proposes a conception of linguistic practice (involving > an internal/external distinction) under which ontological > investigations cannot meaningfully be undertaken. > > * Quine criticises this by linking it to the problems of the > analytic/synthetic distinction. > > * Yablo modifies Carnap's position so that the distinction is made > on metaphorical/literal grounds in instead. > > * This new position requires that the Quinean provide a principle > of demarcation between metaphor and literal truth in order for their > ontology to prevail. > > * No such principle has been provided and so the Quinean > ontological project fails. > > http://xeny.net/Yablo.Ontology > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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