2009/9/16 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:

> The discussion seems to have gotten stuck on whether it
> has been proven that physics can't be fundamental because it can't
> include consciousness.

Has it?  I thought we were discussing whether CTM made any meaningful
commitments as a physical theory, not whether physics can or can't
include consciousness per se.  Now you raise the question, I don't
believe it can, simply because in common with virtually every other
human attempt to characterise the world, its perspective is embedded
in consciousness and hence can't envision it.  Comp may sheds light
both on the propositional content and observational regularities of
consciousness, which itself is important and enlightening, but
nonetheless seems just as unlikely to illuminate the medium in which
it is embedded.

> Since we don't
> really have a definite idea of what consciousness is let's see what the
> theory does tell us - then we can worry about where physics fits.

If you're still talking about CTM, then I think we can see already
that physics has nothing to do with it.  But I agree wholeheartedly
that we should be completely open to what any theory may tell us at
this stage of our endarkenment.

David

>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>
>>
>>>> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
>>>> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
>>>> Platonically, other than that different labels are being used.  What
>>>> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does not,
>>>> and what difference is this supposed to make?  Can you help, Peter?
>>>>
>>> Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning.
>>> Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 7 exists,
>>> since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think
>>> 7 has Platonic existence.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological'
>> makes in this context.  Surely whatever world-conjuring power numbers
>> may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them?  If a
>> mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a moot
>> point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
>>
>> David
> Sure.  There are different models of the world.  Each model takes some
> things as existing and tries to explain the rest in terms of relations,
> processes, interactions, or whatever.  The Standard Model takes quarks
> and leptons and does a pretty impressive job of explaining everything
> but gravity and consciousness (which is probably what inspired Penrose
> to try to explain mind in terms of gravity).  String theory tries to
> explain both particles and gravity in terms of strings (or branes); but
> it has it's own 'white rabbit' problem.  Bruno wants to take arithemetic
> as basic.  But so far I don't see that his theory has predicted (as
> opposed to retrodicted) anything except that it has a white rabbit
> problem too.  The discussion seems to have gotten stuck on whether it
> has been proven that physics can't be fundamental because it can't
> include consciousness.  I consider that a diversion.  Since we don't
> really have a definite idea of what consciousness is let's see what the
> theory does tell us - then we can worry about where physics fits.
>
> Brent
>
> >
>

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