2009/9/18 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal >> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed >> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed >> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect >> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc? > > Standard CTM holds that tokens of computation are identical to > tokens of physical activity, so they have whatever causal > powers their physical realisers have.
What are the ontological consequences for materialism of such a view of computational-physical identity? Is there a logically or contingently possible material world that contains structurally identical computational zombies, in your view? David > > > > On 17 Sep, 17:35, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: >> 2009/9/17 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >> >> > Then for the inside/personal views, the whole of human math including >> > Cantor paradise cannot be enough to describe the human mind. It is >> > more general: >> >> In that case, what light does the comp approach shed on the 'causal >> significance' of the inside view - i.e. with reference to the presumed >> 'causal closure' of the physical narrative and the supposed >> epiphenominalism or over-determination of consciousness with respect >> to behaviour - Chalmers' zombies etc? > > Standard CTM holds that tokens of computation are identical to > tokens of physical activity, so they have whatever causal > powers their physical realisers have. > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
