rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: > Possibly of interest. I haven't read it, but it sounds intriguingly > Brunoesque.
Sounds more like David. :-) Bruno is always clear. Brent >Perhaps Bruno could comment. > > After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, > Quentin Meillassoux > > http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=14447 > > Particularly: > > By claiming that physical laws are contingent, Meillassoux proposes in > chapter 4 a speculative solution to Hume's problem of primary and > secondary qualities. The author's treatment of what at first could > have passed for an innocuous metaphysical non-problem is implemented > in order to transform our outlook on unreason. A truly speculative > solution to Hume's problem must conceive a world devoid of any > physical necessity that, nevertheless, would still be compatible with > the stability of its physical laws. Here contingency is the key > concept that, insofar as it is extracted from Humean-Kantian > necessitarianism and thus distinguished from chance, enables > Meillassoux to explain how and why Cantor's transfinite number could > constitute a condition for the stability of chaos. Here we find the > transition from the primary absolute to the secondary or > mathematically inflected absolute. The demonstration thus consists in > implementing the ontological implications of the Zermelo-Cantorian > axiomatic as stipulated by Alain Badiou in his Being and Event. This > axiomatic enables Meillassoux to show that for those forms of aleatory > reasoning to which Hume and Kant were subservient, what is a priori > possible can only be conceived as a numerical totality, as a Whole. > However, this totalization can no longer be guaranteed a priori, since > Cantor's axiomatic rules out the possibility of maintaining that the > conceivable can necessarily be totalized. Thus Cantor provides the > tool for a mathematical way of distinguishing contingency from chance, > and this tool is none other than the transfinite, which Meillassoux > translates into an elegant and economical statement: "the > (qualifiable) totality of the thinkable is unthinkable." (104) This > means that in the absence of any certainty regarding the totalization > of the possible, we should limit the scope of aleatory reasoning to > objects of experience, rather than extending it to the very laws that > rule our universe (as Kant illegitimately did in the Critique of Pure > Reason), as if we knew that the these laws necessarily belong to some > greater Whole. > > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---