On 1 Sep, 18:35, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather
> that comp is CTM properly understood. Its 'supervention' on
> virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside -
> means that demanding that it further supervene on distinguishable
> 'platonic entities' is equivalent to demanding that it further
> supervene on PM, and hence equally superfluous. That is, you can
> believe it if you like but it is inconsequential. I realise that
> these conclusions are surprising (they certainly surprise me) and that
> of course they are not what most believers (and it is a belief) in CTM
> assume; but that does not mitigate their force.
Bruno can conclude that but he certainly shouldn't assume it.
> What is consequent on all of this is that prior acceptance of CTM
> nullifies the force of your sceptical argument, because in making the
> assumption you have perforce abandoned scepticism with regard to its
> necessary consequences. If you like, belief in CTM is belief in the
> ghost in the machine, and ghosts and machines don't interact. You may
> regain your more general scepticism at the cost of relinquishing the
> assumption of CTM.
Nothing of the kind follows from CTM unless you can make
a MGA or Olympia argument work
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