David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
>>> argument?
>> I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>>> You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
>>> cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
>>> the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?  If so, why didn't
>>> you say so?  And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM?
> Would you respond to this please?
>>>> I find them both quite contestable
>>> If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument.
>> e.g.
>> http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS
> Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might
> be considered a valid computational realisation.  Were this accepted
> as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing
> the adequacy of the realisation.  This is however a separate question
> to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of
> homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which
> does not depend on any particular reductio argument.  Klein does not
> set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that "I
> remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the
> first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is
> realized in each case by some first-order property".
> The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal
> standards of physical explanation.  The very notion of computation is
> based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific
> physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external
> interpretation of a functionally-defined class. This is not
> problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person
> experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we
> could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any
> normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a
> physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
> physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
> relation between them.  Such a theory would of course escape the
> vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment
> inherent in MR.

Such a theory is available.  It is the evolutionary account of the 
development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, 
Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett.  Knowing the physical function of a 
species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you 
could infer what it is conscious of.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to