On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

 >> What would make a theory of consciousness a
> > physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
> > physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
> > relation between them.  Such a theory would of course escape the
> > vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment
> > inherent in MR.
>
> Such a theory is available.  It is the evolutionary account of the
> development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio,
> Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett.

Well, I've read Damasio, Jaynes and Dennett, all at some length, and
whilst each offers fascinating insight from his own perspective, I
don't think that any of them could be said to offer a physical causal
theory of first-person experience in the sense we are discussing
here.  Does Metzinger go any further?  I've got quite a lot on my
reading list so I've been resisting the temptation to add him to it
for the moment - should I succumb?

> Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary 
> history
> of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of.

True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a
first-person experiential one.  I'm right in assuming that you don't
intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal
of first-person experience - yes?  I didn't think that was your
position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently
that I'm starting to wonder.

David

> David Nyman wrote:
> > 2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
> >>> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
> >>> argument?
> >> I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>
> >>> You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> >>> cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
> >>> the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?  If so, why didn't
> >>> you say so?  And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM?
>
> > Would you respond to this please?
>
> >>>> I find them both quite contestable
> >>> If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument.
> >> e.g.
> >>http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS
>
> > Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might
> > be considered a valid computational realisation.  Were this accepted
> > as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing
> > the adequacy of the realisation.  This is however a separate question
> > to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of
> > homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which
> > does not depend on any particular reductio argument.  Klein does not
> > set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that "I
> > remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the
> > first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is
> > realized in each case by some first-order property".
>
> > The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal
> > standards of physical explanation.  The very notion of computation is
> > based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific
> > physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external
> > interpretation of a functionally-defined class. This is not
> > problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person
> > experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we
> > could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any
> > normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a
> > physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
> > physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
> > relation between them.  Such a theory would of course escape the
> > vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment
> > inherent in MR.
>
> Such a theory is available.  It is the evolutionary account of the
> development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio,
> Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett.  Knowing the physical function of a
> species sensors and the evolutionary history of it's environment you
> could infer what it is conscious of.
>
> Brent
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to