David Nyman wrote: > On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: > > >> What would make a theory of consciousness a >>> physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of >>> physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise >>> relation between them. Such a theory would of course escape the >>> vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment >>> inherent in MR. >> Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the >> development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, >> Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. > > Well, I've read Damasio, Jaynes and Dennett, all at some length, and > whilst each offers fascinating insight from his own perspective, I > don't think that any of them could be said to offer a physical causal > theory of first-person experience in the sense we are discussing > here. Does Metzinger go any further? I've got quite a lot on my > reading list so I've been resisting the temptation to add him to it > for the moment - should I succumb? > >> Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary >> history >> of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of. > > True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a > first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't > intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal > of first-person experience - yes? I didn't think that was your > position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently > that I'm starting to wonder.
I don't have "a position" on such an unsettled question. But I think what you are asking is incoherent - a first-person account physical account of experience. Can you give an example what such an account might look like? Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---