David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> 
>  >> What would make a theory of consciousness a
>>> physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
>>> physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
>>> relation between them.  Such a theory would of course escape the
>>> vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment
>>> inherent in MR.
>> Such a theory is available.  It is the evolutionary account of the
>> development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio,
>> Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett.
> 
> Well, I've read Damasio, Jaynes and Dennett, all at some length, and
> whilst each offers fascinating insight from his own perspective, I
> don't think that any of them could be said to offer a physical causal
> theory of first-person experience in the sense we are discussing
> here.  Does Metzinger go any further?  I've got quite a lot on my
> reading list so I've been resisting the temptation to add him to it
> for the moment - should I succumb?
> 
>> Knowing the physical function of a species sensors and the evolutionary 
>> history
>> of it's environment you could infer what it is conscious of.
> 
> True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a
> first-person experiential one.  I'm right in assuming that you don't
> intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal
> of first-person experience - yes?  I didn't think that was your
> position, but you've made this kind of comment so frequently recently
> that I'm starting to wonder.

I don't have "a position" on such an unsettled question.  But I think what you 
are asking 
  is incoherent - a first-person account physical account of experience.  Can 
you give an 
example what such an account might look like?

Brent

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