On 23 Sep, 02:06, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
> >> argument?
> > I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> >> cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
> >> the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?  If so, why didn't
> >> you say so?  And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM?
> Would you respond to this please?

I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts

> >> > I find them both quite contestable
> >> If you would risk saying precisely why, you might have a counter-argument.
> > e.g.
> >http://philpapers.org/rec/KLEDIS
> Klein's criticism of Maudlin is concerned with constraining what might
> be considered a valid computational realisation.  Were this accepted
> as reasonable, he could attack that particular reductio by disputing
> the adequacy of the realisation.  This is however a separate question
> to the lack of any consistent justification of the association of
> homogeneous experiential states to heterogeneous physical ones, which
> does not depend on any particular reductio argument.  Klein does not
> set out to address this issue, but tips his hand by remarking that "I
> remain neutral between identifying the disposition with the
> first-order property or treating it as a second-order property that is
> realized in each case by some first-order property".
> The problem with CTM as a physical theory is that it violates normal
> standards of physical explanation.

Alternatively, that is what is just so handy about it....

>The very notion of computation is
> based not on a consistent self-selection of a specific
> physically-defined class of events, but rather on an external
> interpretation of a functionally-defined class.

Says who? The in-the-eye-of the observer notion of computation
is contentious. The addition of side-constraints, such as
to the defintiion of computation is motivated precisely to avoid
dryign paint implementing any possible computation. And the
Maudlin argument exploits that to show that computation is narrowed
down so much that no physical system can compute a mind. And then the
argument widens the definition of computation out again....

...the moral of the story being that you can't have your argument
that computing is in the eye of the beholder AND your
your firm faith in the MGA/olympia style of argument.
They work from different assumptions.

>This is not
> problematic in the third-person sense, but if a first-person
> experiential state is to be considered equivalent merely to what we
> could say about something, then it is not a physical state in any
> normally understood sense. What would make a theory of consciousness a
> physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
> physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
> relation between them.  Such a theory would of course escape the
> vulnerability to accusations of lack of meaningful physical commitment
> inherent in MR.
> >> The point at issue is not whether there is only one way to realise a
> >> computation, or to get from A to B.  The point is that in the case of
> >> the journey, the transition from physical irrelevance to relevance is
> >> at the point where the physical result emerges as identical - i.e. as
> >> the same journey form A to B.  In the case of the computation, no such
> >> physical identity of result ever emerges;
> > Instead there is functional identity and functional relevance...
> Sure, and that makes CTM a functional theory, supervening on
> functional relata, and appealing to a purely functional association
> with consciousness.  In what remaining sense that makes any difference
> can CTM claim to be a materialist theory?

It doesn;t need anything non-physical, as I have said
several times.

>To say that nonetheless it
> must be materially instantiated is no answer; it is merely begging the
> question.

It doesn;t require anything non-physical either.

> >>all you have is a collection
> >> of heterogeneous physical processes, each merely *formally* identical
> >> to a given computation.  It is a further - and physically entirely ad
> >> hoc - assumption that this heterogeneity of physical states is
> >> homogeneous with a single experiential state.
> > It is not entirely ad hoc because not every physical system
> > implements every computation.
> The fact that "not every physical system implements every computation"
> doesn't reduce the ad-hoccery in the slightest, because the whole
> notion of implementation is immaterial from the outset.  There's
> nothing physically fundamental about a computationally-defined
> 'realisation' - it is merely an externally-imposed interpretation of a
> physical state of affairs that is perfectly capable of causing
> whatever lies within its powers without such aid.  The only
> interesting question from a physical perspective is what those powers
> might be.

> >> > THat would be because they make no computational difference,
> >> > if CTM is correct.
> >> If all you have to offer is circular arguments we shall simply go
> >> round in circles.
> > Saying CTM is wrong because it is based
> > on computational equivalence not physical equivalence is circular.
> I've made it abundantly clear that I'm not saying that CTM is wrong;
> I'm just saying that if it's right, then ex hypothesi this cannot be
> in virtue of the standard sense of physical causation invoked in any
> other context.  That is not circular.

The circularity is sayign that a non-causal theory must
be wrong because it is non-causal.

>What you're resisting is the
> conclusion that this has any necessary entailment for the direction of
> inference from the mathematical to the physical, or vice versa.  I
> think that in common with reflexive believers in CTM - though you say
> you're not of their company - you are surreptitiously and
> unjustifiably conflating merely functionally-defined classes of
> physical events with primary physical causation, in order to ignore
> the intractable problem of justifying a consistent linkage between the
> specifically experiential and the specifically physical.

Nope. There is not justfication from the a  non-computaitonal
physcial theory either , since there is no solution to the HP.
So they are on all fours.

> >> Hence CTM entails that one experiential state reduces to
> >> multiple physical states, without being able to give any consistent
> >> physical, as opposed to formal, criterion for such identity.
> > You say that';s a problem. It's like saying
> > the problem with bananas is that they are
> > yellow and long not red and round
> If you're saying that I'm demanding something of CTM that it doesn't
> - and cannot - set out to explain, you're right.  I also concede that
> it's reasonable to propose such a hypothesis, but not that it's
> reasonable to avoid the conclusion that terminal violence has thereby
> been done to the fundamental project of physical justification.  I've
> consistently and clearly stated why this is a problem for CTM on a
> primitively material basis.  I'm hardly the only person who takes this
> view, and AFAICS the justified objections are all on this side.  The
> usual response - including yours - seems to be no more than "according
> to CTM the impossibility of standard physical justification doesn't
> disqualify CTM as a physical theory".  That is merely circular.

No, i have told you what physicalist criteria it *does* meet
several times.

> >>  Prima
> >> facie this renders any claim that consciousness is identical with
> >> physical states physically empty (i.e. without significant commitment)
> >> and under further analysis, renders it grossly implausible.
> > What does "empty" mean? You can still
> > have token-identity. And Computationalists
> > don't even want type identity.
> For pity's sake, you surely already know the answer to this.  I don't
> care what computationalists say they want, I'm concerned with what
> they are justified in laying claim to.

And not concerned with what avowed physicalists
think physicalism is?

> And token-identities or
> type-identities are not to be conflated with parallel accounts of
> physical and experiential processes in any standard sense of physical
> commitment.

What does "parallel account" mean?

>To say that the association can be anything that the
> external imputation of functional equivalence says it can be, is to
> depart from any substantive commitment to explicit physical
> justification whatsoever.

Oh sure. But computationalists aren't commited to sayign that.
You seem to have got confused between two different
lines of argument.

> This is obvious - why do you dispute it?

It's not the kind of computaitonalism maudlin-klein
is about. Why did you intorduce it?

> Actually, sometimes you do
> and sometimes you don't.

No, I have never accepted it. MR does not depend
on ITEOTB. (in the eye of the beholder).

>So far as CTM as a theoretical approach is
> concerned, this lack of commitment to a material base may be a
> strength not a weakness.  But this entails entertaining a different
> intuition about the relative primacy of physical and mathematical
> accounts of states of affairs.  But since appeals to the 'substantive'
> nature - as opposed to the theoretical and methodological constraints
> - of any putative metaphysical primitives are so devoid of
> consequence, such reluctance can perhaps be overcome, surely?

Materialism is not disporved by CTM,

> >> Is this materialism's last gasp?  A materialist theory requires a
> >> materialist approach to explanation, else its commitment to
> >> materialism is, shall we say, somewhat non-committal.
> > YOu may see materialism as an endangered species,
> > but the truth is the other way round. Hardly anyone thinks
> > that the multiple realisability of computation makes
> > computation somehting ghostly. Well, Bruno does,
> > but he is in the minority.
> I do not, in fact, see materialism in this way.  My concern is simply
> the fit or otherwise between CTM and PM, and in this sense to claim
> CTM as a plausible materialist hypothesis merely on the basis of the
> otherwise unsupported indispensability and effectiveness  of a
> material substrate is an entirely circular argument.

To be a plausible materialist basis CTM only needs to be compatible
with materialism.

>The analysis
> does not, of course, depend on consensus, but on correctness.  And my
> argument doesn't hinge on the ghostliness of computation, but its lack
> of consistent association with physical causation of experience, in a
> context where no other justified causal account is offered.
> David
> > On 13 Sep, 17:51, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> 2009/9/11 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> >> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making.  If as you say the
> >> >> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
> >> >> consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised
> >> >> computation could be identical to any mental state.
> >> > That doesn't follow because causation and identity are different
> >> > The realisation could be consciousness (fire IS combustion)
> >> > without causing it (fire CAUSES smoke but it not smoke)
> >> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
> >> argument?
> > I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> >> cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
> >> the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?  If so, why didn't
> >> you say so?  And how would that now influence your evaluation of CTM?
> ...
>
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