2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >>if it can't, we need another strategy to >> disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter >> conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in >> comp. > > There is no ambiguity in the reduction of computation > to physics.
How long can you go on arguing what is not disputed? Keep clearly in mind the third-person, first-person distinction. There is no ambiguity in the physical reduction of any realisation from a third-person perspective. From this perspective, the homogeneity of state that supervenes on the physical heterogeneity is merely one of interpretation - i.e. it is an abstraction and immaterial to the physical account. The problem is in introducing a mental type that equates to the computational one; now you have an actual homogeneity of experience to explain, not merely a metaphor. But there is no way to explain it on the basis of any consistent physical low-level account of a mental type; only a different one for each occasion of realisation. We're not only talking about small differences between brains, we're talking about any arbitrary level of physical heterogeneity that falls within the type. This is an ineluctable consequence of MR. But it is unrelated to the process of consistent hierarchical reduction that is central to physical explanation. This leaves CTM entirely devoid of any physical basis for attaching a homogeneous first-person experience to heterogeneous physical processes other than its own brute general posit; and circularity can count as explanation in nobody's book. This point is never argued in detail by supporters of CTM - rather anyone who points it out is denounced as unenlightened and unworthy of a reply in kind. Certainly they don't get one. Whether this motivates abandoning PM rather than CTM depends on how strongly one is committed to PM. If the fishy smell left by the shoulder-shrug that passes for physical justification in CTM nonetheless leaves one with a residual appetite for computationalism as an explanation for mind, then the switch in metaphysical posit may be preferable, at least as a working hypothesis. David > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---