Excellent points, Stathis.
What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of a
knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding about
The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that both
are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and so
evolve differently.
I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not
'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our
'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are (anybody
knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought to
add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the
(What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know about
some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by the
brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow").

On Sun, Oct 4, 2009 at 12:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>wrote:

> 2009/10/1 Miroslav Dobsicek <m.dobsi...@gmail.com>:
> >
> > In the September'09 issue of The Reasoner
> >
> >
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(9).pdf
> >
> > Fonseca and Gartner present an argument for a difference between the
> > first and third person point of view. In the October issue,
> >
> >
> http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol3/TheReasoner-3(10).pdf
> >
> > the argument is being criticized by Erich Rast. I don't find the
> > argument very convincing since their notion of simulation is too vague.
> > However, I don't follow the criticism. Could someone help a little bit?
> In the articles, there are two persons, P1 and P2, where P2 is an
> exact physical clone of P1 created by an external observer P3. P1 has
> the self S1, comprising a set of beliefs and attitudes, including the
> knowledge k* that this experiment is occurring and the belief bel* "I
> am P1". P2 has the self S2, which by definition contains the same set
> of beliefs and attitudes, so S1=S2. The first article suggests that
> bel* lacks a truth value from the POV of P1 or P2, but does have a
> truth value from the POV of P3. This is claimed to be "somewhat
> paradoxical", since it means S1=S2 in one case but not in the other.
> However, the second article makes the point that knowledge (true
> belief) depends on external reality and cannot be relative to a
> simulation, and claims that this invalidates the first article's
> conclusions that you can never know if you are the clone or the
> original and that the identity of the self is relative to the POV.
> It appears that "person" in these articles is used to mean physical
> instantiation while "self" is used to mean consciousness. I don't see
> why it is claimed in the first article that S1=/S2 from P3's POV,
> since S refers only to subjective content, and therefore I don't see
> the relevance of the second article's assertion that knowledge depends
> on external reality. I agree that it is impossible to know if you are
> the clone or the original but the claim that identity of the self is
> relative to the POV seems to me to be meaningless.
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
> >

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