Good morning, Stathis,
thanks for the friendly early-bird detailed reply - I like almost all of
Just to keep the tradition of the list:
"...billions of other people could observe, record and share about you,
given the opportunity, even if there are individual differences..."
this is like a 'democratic voting' (what I deny) where everybody has
different interests, yet vote for one (the best liar) - just to have a
consensus. Those "individual differences" may be devastating beyond the
boundaries we usually limit our opinios to. Show me ONE instant where the
personal input of adjustment does not enter - even public - understanding of
any 'opinion'. And thanks for the 1st par. last sentence's "somehow" - a
landmark for me<G>.
If the experiment keeps the instantiations so that they
"...remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times..."
then I reject the reality of those experimental conditions. A clone is
different from it's original even at a most careful identity measure, if not
otherwise by some different (spatial? etc.) (co)-ordinates for environmental
Such instrumental differences also arise from (sub?)molecular built of
structure, the origin of atoms (if I condone such physicalistic figments at
* I stand corrected*: No clone can be "identical", not even at the
instantiation level. (*My fundamental objection to any 'teleportational'
replication as well*).
"We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..."
Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist ideas are
at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would say "NO"
to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new brain
would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but not
digitally limited) *primitive* brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha ha)
Have a good week
On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 5:58 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>wrote:
> 2009/10/5 John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>:
> > Excellent points, Stathis.
> > What I would add (maybe as my Ciceronian "Ceterum censeo") is the lack of
> > knowable POV of P3: 'we' can only realize OUR version of understanding
> > it.
> This is true, but there is a distinction between the private and the
> public. What I am able to observe, record and share about you has a
> lot in common with what billions of other people could observe, record
> and share about you, given the opportunity, even if there are
> individual differences. But what you experience yourself is - somehow
> - qualitatively different.
> > The POV S1 = S2 is true only at the instantiation, because affter that
> > are under non-identical influences of their particulat environments and
> > evolve differently.
> I think it is assumed for the purpose of the experiment that the
> relevant environments are controlled so that the two instantiations
> remain close enough that S1=S2 at all times. Of course, in practice if
> you made an exact copy of yourself and released it into the
> environment within fractions of a second it will start to
> differentiate from you.
> > I also wonder about the "physical" in the clones' identity: we are not
> > 'physical' at all, the figment of the materialist evaluation of our
> > 'personhood' or 'self' is not substitutable for what we really are
> > knows the answer to that?) - but SOME mentality I am magnanimous enought
> > add to all of us. Unless, of course, someone includes such into the
> > "physical".
> > (What some neurologists seem willing to do on the basis that we know
> > some physical-physiological treatment applied to mental domains done by
> > brain-tissue tool and wash away the rest (unknown?) into a "somehow").
> We start off assuming a physicalist comp (for want of a better term)
> where the mental supervenes on the physical, which is what Bruno is
> getting at (as a first step) when he asks if you will say "yes" to the
> doctor if offered a new digital brain. But then, following this
> assumption to its conclusion, it turns out that physicalist comp is
> quite difficult to maintain.
> Stathis Papaioannou
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at