2009/10/7 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our > discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of > "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your > private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel > that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1- > I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable. > I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably > between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?
For me, RITSIAR refers to 1-I. I think the disagreement over ontology has been largely about whether theoretical schemas, based on AR or PM, must be treated as RITSIAR in a directly identified 3-I sense. I think rather that the union between theoretical entities and 1-RITSIAR can only be approached asymptotically. This seems to me to stem directly from the 1-p "undoubtable" /3-p "doubtable" distinction - the gap can never be completely eliminated. This means we should have strong reservations about taking any combination of 3-p and 1-p "literally" - especially given the very incomplete state of our current knowledge; the issues are rather those of explanatory and predictive fruitfulness. This seems to me to be quite a different issue from the one of distinguishing fiction from fact within a given schema, which is a matter of internal reference. David > > John, Stathis, Mirek, Peter, > > On 06 Oct 2009, at 13:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote to John,: > > >> > >> "We start off assuming a physicalist comp ..." > >> > >> Not me, sorry, I stay with the 'assumption' that our physicalist > >> ideas are > >> at best scientifically (math? etc.) supported figments. And I would > >> say "NO" > >> to the doctor (sorry, Bruno) because I don't know how good that new > >> brain > >> would be in comparison to my present (incompletely functioning, but > >> not > >> digitally limited) primitive brain - the TOOL for my (beloved! ha > >> ha) mind. > > > > So your position is, simply, that you don't agree with > > computationalism, which invalidates any subsequent argument taking > > computationalism as a starting point. That's OK, as long as we are > > clear that this is the case. > > > > John, I appreciate Stathis' answer. The goal has never been to > convinced anybody that comp is true. > Actuallyy, I have the feeling that *too much* scientist believes in > comp, and this without realizing the consequences. > > On the contrary, the goal here is to show how much "crazy" comp is, > once we dare to take it as literally true. Notably to show that comp > leads to the first person indeterminacies, and eventually to the > reversal of the current Aristotelian theology (shared by many atheists > and christians alike) which relies on a 'religious belief/dogma" on > the primary character of matter. > > Actually comp *is*, strictly speaking, unbelievable. With some natural > definition it can be shown provably unbelievable by (correct) machines > (assuming their consistency), and that is why I insist that comp is > directly akin to an act of faith, and that saying yes to the doctor is > a theological act. > > Personally, I doubt comp, but this is a bit diabolical, because > (correct) machine have to doubt comp for remaining consistent. So my > doubt confirms comp. Of course a confirmation is not a proof, so I can > doubt comp and remain consistent! > > Mirek, I agree with Stathis about his comment on the papers you > refered too. > Note that it is very difficult to define completely what a first > person is, but, for the matter of reasoning partial definitions can > work very well, and note that those definitions used in UDA and AUDA > do refer only to sharable third person notions. (In science we cannot > invoke as argument first person truth, but of course we can tackle the > first person notion itself. Through assumptions and definitions, the > notion of first person is partially amenable to third person notions. > > In the UDA the first person discourse are defined by the memory, or > the personal diary of the one who enter the teleporting (or > duplicating) devices. So it is the memory of the one who is > annihilated and reconstituted. The 3 person is just the usual > discourse of an external (with respect to the teleporting device) > observer. This works very well for a (artifiicial) machine. It is > obvious that a program cannot measure the delay where it is not > executed, for example, so the difference between first and third > person is made obvious (self-duplication made it even observable in > some sense). > > In the AUDA, it is more difficult, and I have been stuck on this > during many years. But then I realized that the oldest definition of a > "knower", the one which define 'knowing' by believing a truth, works > very well in that context, and so I defined, in arithmetic, the first > person by the arithmetical knower, following Boolos and Goldblat. To > know that 1+1=2 is Beweisbar(godel number of '1+1=2') & 1+1 = 2. > > Such a definition of knowledge is well debated since a long time by > philosophers. It appears in very old Indian and Chinese texts, and in > the Theaetetus of Plato. In fine, you can see that those who object to > such a definition are those who believe that they can distinguish > reality and dream, or, in our context, reality and digital simulation > of it, and this instantaneously. Again, this would contradict comp > (our working hypothesis). I refer you to the second paper you have > mentioned as an example. > > Another example treated in detail in "conscience et mécanisme" are > works by Malcolm. In a book on 'dreaming' Malcolm argues that we are > not conscious during a dream, and in papers he argues against comp. > The logical structure of the argument are identicals. > > Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our > discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of > "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your > private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you feel > that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of the 1- > I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are doubtable. > I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably > between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think? > > Soon, but not so soon, hopefully this or next week, some more > explanation on diagonalization. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
