On 08 Oct 2009, at 03:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/10/7 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> Peter, this thread on the 1 and 3 persons is relevant for our
>> discussions, with David. You have not answered if the second "I" of
>> "ritsiar" (= real in the sense that I am real) concerns the 1-I (your
>> private consciousness here and now) or the 3-I (the body that you
>> that you have). I think nobody can really doubt the 'reality' of
>> the 1-
>> I". The 3-I, or any combinations of the 1-I and the 3-I are
>> I think that there has been some misunderstanding here, notably
>> between you and David, on exactly this. David, what do you think?
> For me, RITSIAR refers to 1-I.
That is what I thought.
> I think the disagreement over ontology
> has been largely about whether theoretical schemas, based on AR or PM,
> must be treated as RITSIAR in a directly identified 3-I sense. I
> think rather that the union between theoretical entities and 1-RITSIAR
> can only be approached asymptotically.
> This seems to me to stem
> directly from the 1-p "undoubtable" /3-p "doubtable" distinction - the
> gap can never be completely eliminated. This means we should have
> strong reservations about taking any combination of 3-p and 1-p
> "literally" - especially given the very incomplete state of our
> current knowledge; the issues are rather those of explanatory and
> predictive fruitfulness. This seems to me to be quite a different
> issue from the one of distinguishing fiction from fact within a given
> schema, which is a matter of internal reference.
I think so. Note that the "interview of the universal machine" does
already predict a gap between some of the possible point sof view of
the arithmetically correct machines.
This seemss impossible given that it leads to a scientific (pure 3-
communicable) 'theology' who's first fundamental theorem asserts that
'theology' cannot be scientific.
The paradox vanishes when you see that a machine can only study the
(correct) theology of a correct machine, and then just pray she is
herself correct. A correct machine, by Gödel and Tarski, can never
known, nor even express its own correctness. Yet a machine can already
study the complete theology of much simpler machine than herself. And
the machine can prove that the theology is invariant for all
machine ... as far as they remain correct, which, from an indexical
perspective (be it the 1-I or 3-I) is necessarily on the order of
faith or bet.
Yet the theology of machine does contain its physics, and this makes
the machine theology and the whole comp hypothesis refutable
empirically, or confirmable. At that point it is very important to
understand that a empirical confirmation is never a proof.
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