On Dec 31 2009, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> You may be right. But it is still an open problem to just define
> probability (except the probability one) in the mechanist settting.
> Rich metaphor, but a promise for a lot of work, to make this precise
> enough in the mechanist frame. It would mean that not only we have a
> measure (and a linear base of observable/operators) but also a richer
> differential structure. Who knows? You may try to be more precise,
> even without taking the mechanist constraint into consideration.
Yes. I'm looking for an applied logic of uncertainty associated with
sets or categories. Can you name such a logic?
> With non-mechanism, you may consider Penrose's (very speculative) idea
> that mind reduces the wave by being related to gravitation (space-time
> curve). Not sure it makes really sense, but then, with non-comp, we
> may try ... everything.
> It seems obvious to me that Bayes is a particular case of inference.
> There are *many* others.
I think Penrose is nonsense if taken literally, he's looking at the
wrong level of organization, mind has got nothing to do with
fundamental physics directly I think. But speaking *metaphorically*
it can lead to good ideas. So speaking metaphorically only,
information integration in the mind (categorization) could be said to
be analogous to space-time curvature. And then the probabilities are
analogous to the apparent forces. But I'll stick to comp I think.
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