On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 1:49 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>wrote:
> silky wrote: > >> On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 10:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou >> <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >>> 2010/1/19 silky <michaelsli...@gmail.com>: >>> >>> >>>> On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 1:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou < >>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> 2010/1/18 silky <michaelsli...@gmail.com>: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> It would be my (naive) assumption, that this is arguably trivial to >>>>>> do. We can design a program that has a desire to 'live', as desire to >>>>>> find mates, and otherwise entertain itself. In this way, with some >>>>>> other properties, we can easily model simply pets. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Brent's reasons are valid, >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Where it falls down for me is that the programmer should ever feel >>>> guilt. I don't see how I could feel guilty for ending a program when I >>>> know exactly how it will operate (what paths it will take), even if I >>>> can't be completely sure of the specific decisions (due to some >>>> randomisation or whatever) I don't see how I could ever think "No, you >>>> can't harm X". But what I find very interesting, is that even if I >>>> knew *exactly* how a cat operated, I could never kill one. >>>> >>>> >>> That's not being rational then, is it? >>> >>> >> >> Exactly my point! I'm trying to discover why I wouldn't be so rational >> there. Would you? Do you think that knowing all there is to know about >> a cat is unpractical to the point of being impossible *forever*, or do >> you believe that once we do know, we will simply "end" them freely, >> when they get in our way? I think at some point we *will* know all >> there is to know about them, and even then, we won't end them easily. >> Why not? Is it the emotional projection that Brent suggests? Possibly. >> >> >> >> >>> but I don't think making an artificial >>>>> animal is as simple as you say. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> So is it a complexity issue? That you only start to care about the >>>> entity when it's significantly complex. But exactly how complex? Or is >>>> it about the unknowningness; that the project is so large you only >>>> work on a small part, and thus you don't fully know it's workings, and >>>> then that is where the guilt comes in. >>>> >>>> >>> Obviously intelligence and the ability to have feelings and desires >>> has something to do with complexity. It would be easy enough to write >>> a computer program that pleads with you to do something but you don't >>> feel bad about disappointing it, because you know it lacks the full >>> richness of human intelligence and consciousness. >>> >>> >> >> Indeed; so part of the question is: Qhat level of complexity >> constitutes this? Is it simply any level that we don't understand? Or >> is there a level that we *can* understand that still makes us feel >> that way? I think it's more complicated than just any level we don't >> understand (because clearly, I "understand" that if I twist your arm, >> it will hurt you, and I know exactly why, but I don't do it). >> >> > > I don't think you know exactly why, unless you solved the problem of > connecting qualia (pain) to physics (afferent nerve transmission) - but I > agree that you know it heuristically. > > For my $0.02 I think that not understanding is significant because it > leaves a lacuna which we tend to fill by projecting ourselves. When people > didn't understand atmospheric physics they projected super-humans that > produced the weather. If you let some Afghan peasants interact with a > fairly simple AI program, such as used in the Loebner competition, they > might well conclude you had created an artificial person; even though it > wouldn't fool anyone computer literate. > > But even for an AI that we could in principle understand, if it is complex > enough and acts enough like an animal I think we would feel ethical concerns > for it. I think a more difficult case is an intelligence which is so alien > to us we can't project our feelings on it's behavior. Stanislaw Lem has > written stories on this theme: "Solaris", "His Masters Voice", "Return from > the Stars", "Fiasco". > There doesn't seem to be much recognition of this possibility on this list. > There's generally an implicit assumption that we know what consciousness is, > we have it, and that's the only possible kind of consciousness. All OMs are > human OMs. I think that's one interesting thing about Bruno's theory; it is > definite enough (if I understand it) that it could elucidate different kinds > of consciousness. For example, I think Searle's Chinese room is conscious - > but in a different way than we are. > I'll have to look into these things, but I do agree with you in general; I don't think ours is the only type of consciousness at all. Though I do think the concept that not understanding completely is interesting, because it suggests that a "god" should actually not particularly care what happens to us, because to them it's all predictable. (And obviously, the idea of moral obligations to computer programs is arguably interesting). > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- silky http://www.mirios.com.au/ http://island.mirios.com.au/t/rigby+random+20 REGIMENTATION-passe ENCLOSURE. SPEECHLESSNESS.--
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