On Jan 19, 6:43 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2010/1/19 Nick Prince <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk>: > > >> Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies. What I > >> meant was why they are considered as an indication of measure at the > >> beginning of thought experiments such as the one you discussed (tea/ > >> coffe). Jaques Mallah uses them too (I d like to discuss one of these > >> on the list at a later time). I am not sure why we cannot consider > >> the experiment as just happening to a single copy. That way there > >> would be no confusion regarding whether differentiation is playing > >> an important role. Otherwise I have no difficulty in realising the > >> value of using the copy idea. > > > If we did the experiment with a single copy that would completely > > change it. The copy would have a 90% chance of dying, a 3% of > > surviving and getting coffee and a 7% of surviving and getting tea. > > >> In particular, my views on personal > >> identity have been shaped by these, and I especially can relate to > >> Bruno's ideas the (eight steps of his SANE paper) at least up to the > >> stage just before he discusses platonic realism as a source of a UD > >> which actually "exists"platonically rather than concretely. I do need > >> to think more about this part though. In short the idea that a copy > >> of me can/could be made, to such a level of detail so that it is > >> essentially me, I feel intuitively is correct in principle. However I > >> am concerned that the no clone theorem might be a problem for the > >> continuity of personhood. > > > If the no clone theorem were a problem then you could not survive more > > than a moment, since your brain is constantly undergoing classical > > level changes. > > >> From what I can gather Bruno seems to think > >> not - or at least not important for what he wants to convey - but I > >> would want to explore this at some stage. Otherwise I can feel that > >> there should be no reason why copies should not have continuity of > >> personhood over spatio-temporal intervals and feel themselves to be > >> "identical" (I think of identity as continuity of personhood) - or at > >> least consistent extensions of the original person. Moreover I also > >> believe that if a suitable computer simulation can be built to the > >> right level of detail, which contained the copy as a software > >> construct, then this copy could be a virtual implementation within a > >> rendered environment that would indeed similarly believe himself/ > >> herself to be a consistent extension of the original. I suppose I am > >> essentially a computationalist, although I am not clear as to the > >> difference between it and functionalism yet apart from Turing > >> emulability. I am also comfortable with the idea of differentiation so > >> that if copies can be placed in lock step, as they presumably are > >> across worlds, then 10, 20 or 2000 copies will be felt to be the same > >> conscious entity. You will see that I accept the many worlds theory > >> too. These beliefs are based on either my own prejudice or my > >> intuition but are really more like working hypotheses rather than > >> fixed beliefs and are certainly open to revision or modification. I > >> find the QTI difficult to swallow which is why I want to understand > >> the definitions and concepts associated with it. I want to be able to > >> understand the heated debate about it and QS between Jack and Russell. > > > What do you think could happen if there were 100 copies of you running > > in parallel and 90 were terminated? If you think you would definitely > > continue living as one of the 10 remaining copies then to be > > consistent you have to accept QTI. If you think there is a chance that > > you might die I find it difficult to understand how this could be > > reconciled with any consistent theory of personal identity. > > It's a straightforward consequence of a materialist theory of personal > identity. Whether you survive or not depends on which body you are and > whether it died. > > Brent- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -
Are you saying that you do not subscribe to differentiation? Nick Prince
-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.