On Jan 19, 6:43 pm, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2010/1/19 Nick Prince <m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk>:
> >> Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies.  What I
> >> meant was why they are considered as an indication of measure at the
> >> beginning of thought experiments such as the one you discussed (tea/
> >> coffe).  Jaques Mallah uses them too (I d like to discuss one of these
> >> on the list at a later time).  I am not sure why we cannot consider
> >> the experiment as just happening to a single copy.  That way there
> >> would be no confusion regarding whether differentiation is playing
> >> an important role.  Otherwise I have no difficulty in realising the
> >> value of using the copy idea.
> > If we did the experiment with a single copy that would completely
> > change it. The copy would have a 90% chance of dying, a 3% of
> > surviving and getting coffee and a 7% of surviving and getting tea.
> >> In particular, my views on personal
> >> identity have been shaped by these, and I especially can relate to
> >> Bruno's ideas the (eight steps of his SANE paper) at least up to the
> >> stage just before he discusses platonic realism as a source  of a UD
> >> which actually "exists"platonically rather than concretely. I do need
> >> to think more about this part though.  In short the idea that a copy
> >> of me can/could be made, to such a level of detail so that it is
> >> essentially me, I feel intuitively is correct in principle.  However I
> >> am concerned that the no clone theorem might be a problem for the
> >> continuity of personhood.
> > If the no clone theorem were a problem then you could not survive more
> > than a moment, since your brain is constantly undergoing classical
> > level changes.
> >> From what I can gather Bruno seems to think
> >> not - or at least not important for what he wants to convey - but I
> >> would want to explore this at some stage.  Otherwise I can feel that
> >> there should be no reason why copies should not have continuity of
> >> personhood over spatio-temporal intervals and feel themselves to be
> >> "identical" (I think of identity as continuity of personhood) - or at
> >> least consistent extensions of the original person.  Moreover I also
> >> believe that if a suitable computer simulation can be built to the
> >> right level of detail, which contained the copy as a software
> >> construct,  then this copy could be a virtual implementation within a
> >> rendered environment that would indeed similarly believe himself/
> >> herself to be a consistent extension of the original.  I suppose I am
> >> essentially a computationalist,  although I am not clear as to the
> >> difference between it and functionalism yet apart from Turing
> >> emulability. I am also comfortable with the idea of differentiation so
> >> that if copies can be placed in lock step, as they presumably are
> >> across worlds, then 10, 20 or 2000 copies will be felt to be the same
> >> conscious entity.  You will see that I accept the many worlds theory
> >> too.  These beliefs are based on either my own prejudice or my
> >> intuition but are really more like working hypotheses rather than
> >> fixed beliefs and are certainly open to revision or modification.  I
> >> find the QTI difficult to swallow which is why I want to understand
> >> the definitions and concepts associated with it.  I want to be able to
> >> understand the heated debate about it and QS between Jack and Russell.
> > What do you think could happen if there were 100 copies of you running
> > in parallel and 90 were terminated? If you think you would definitely
> > continue living as one of the 10 remaining copies then to be
> > consistent you have to accept QTI. If you think there is a chance that
> > you might die I find it difficult to understand how this could be
> > reconciled with any consistent theory of personal identity.
> It's a straightforward consequence of a materialist theory of personal
> identity.  Whether you survive or not depends on which body you are and
> whether it died.
> Brent- Hide quoted text -
> - Show quoted text -

Are you saying that you do not subscribe to differentiation?

Nick Prince
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