Bruno, while appreciating your reply to ferrari, I have to ask you a question. You wrote:
*"...What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an artificial kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry a man who already accepted an artificial brain? ..." * giving the *impression* that you may consider 'mind' identical (and exclusively identically functioning) to the humanly so far described tissue-contraption figment (?!) called "BRAIN". (I am talking about 'reflexive' mAmps and topically meaningful blood-flow surge), assigned to (ideational) mind-work). Is this rethorical question of yours a misunderstanding (mine) in the heat of the argumentation, or an acceptance to an extreme materialistic stance? John M * * On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Hi ferrari, > > It is weird, my computer decided that this mail was junk mail. > It is the first time it put an everything list post in the junk list. I am > afraid you hurt its susceptibility :) > > > On 20 Jan 2010, at 19:15, ferrari wrote: > > come on silky, >> >> the answer you know yourself of course. >> >> artificial is artificial. >> > > That is true! artificial is a distinction introduced by humans. (I know it > is not what you mean, but I let you think). > > > > to say you are alive, you must be able to >> reflect on yourself. >> > > Theoretical computer science is born from the (non obvious) discovery that > machine *can* reflect on themselves (in many strong senses). > (More on this in the seventh step thread). > > > > you must be able to >> create >> > > Why do you think Emil post, the first to understand Church thesis (10 years > before Church), decide to call "creative" the set theoretical definition of > machine universality? > > > > and to understand without someone teaching you >> > > We all need teachers, except God or any basic fundamental closed (no > inputs/no outputs) reality. > > > > and most >> important there is nobody who turns >> you on or off (exept your girlfriend ;)). >> > > The universal machines build by humans can be said to be born as slaves. > But this is a contingent fact. > > > > real life has any joice, ai >> has a programmed joice...nothing else. >> > > You just show your prejudices against the computationalist hypothesis. But > the point here is to try to figure out the consequences of that hypothesis. > If we find a contradiction, then we will know better. To ridicule the > hypothesis will not help. Up to now, we only find some weirdness, not a > contradiction. The type of weirdness we find can be shown observable in > nature. This confirms, (but does not prove 'course) the mechanist > hypothesis. > > What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an artificial > kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry a man who > already accepted an artificial brain? Or do you think it would be a zombie > (acting like a human, but having no consciousness). > > Don't worry. Artificial humans will not appear soon. > > Best, > > Bruno > > > On 18 Jan., 06:21, silky <michaelsli...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> I'm not sure if this question is appropriate here, nevertheless, the >>> most direct way to find out is to ask it :) >>> >>> Clearly, creating AI on a computer is a goal, and generally we'll try >>> and implement to the same degree of computational"ness" as a human. >>> But what would happen if we simply tried to re-implement the >>> consciousness of a cat, or some "lesser" consciousness, but still >>> alive, entity. >>> >>> It would be my (naive) assumption, that this is arguably trivial to >>> do. We can design a program that has a desire to 'live', as desire to >>> find mates, and otherwise entertain itself. In this way, with some >>> other properties, we can easily model simply pets. >>> >>> I then wonder, what moral obligations do we owe these programs? Is it >>> correct to turn them off? If so, why can't we do the same to a real >>> life cat? Is it because we think we've not modelled something >>> correctly, or is it because we feel it's acceptable as we've created >>> this program, and hence know all its laws? On that basis, does it mean >>> it's okay to "power off" a real life cat, if we are confident we know >>> all of it's properties? Or is it not the knowning of the properties >>> that is critical, but the fact that we, specifically, have direct >>> control over it? Over its internals? (i.e. we can easily remove the >>> lines of code that give it the desire to 'live'). But wouldn't, then, >>> the removal of that code be equivelant to killing it? If not, why? >>> >>> Apologies if this is too vague or useless; it's just an idea that has >>> been interesting me. >>> >>> -- >>> silky >>> http://www.mirios.com.au/ >>> http://island.mirios.com.au/t/rigby+random+20 >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > >--
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