Bruno,
while appreciating your reply to ferrari, I have to ask you a question. You
wrote:

*"...What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an
artificial kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry
a man who already accepted an artificial brain? ..." *

giving the *impression* that you may consider 'mind' identical (and
exclusively identically functioning) to the humanly so far described
tissue-contraption figment (?!) called "BRAIN".
(I am talking about 'reflexive' mAmps and topically meaningful blood-flow
surge), assigned to (ideational) mind-work).

Is this rethorical question of yours a misunderstanding (mine) in the heat
of the argumentation, or an acceptance to an extreme materialistic stance?

John M

*

*
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Hi ferrari,
>
> It is weird, my computer decided that this mail was junk mail.
> It is the first time it put an everything list post in the junk list. I am
> afraid you hurt its susceptibility :)
>
>
> On 20 Jan 2010, at 19:15, ferrari wrote:
>
> come on silky,
>>
>> the answer you know yourself of course.
>>
>> artificial is artificial.
>>
>
> That is true!  artificial is a distinction introduced by humans. (I know it
> is not what you mean, but I let you think).
>
>
>
> to say you are alive, you must be able to
>> reflect on yourself.
>>
>
> Theoretical computer science is born from the (non obvious) discovery that
> machine *can* reflect on themselves (in many strong senses).
> (More on this in the seventh step thread).
>
>
>
> you must be able to
>> create
>>
>
> Why do you think Emil post, the first to understand Church thesis (10 years
> before Church), decide to call "creative" the set theoretical definition of
> machine universality?
>
>
>
> and to understand without someone teaching you
>>
>
> We all need teachers, except God or any basic fundamental closed (no
> inputs/no outputs) reality.
>
>
>
> and most
>> important there is nobody who turns
>> you on or off (exept your girlfriend ;)).
>>
>
> The universal machines build by humans can be said to be born as slaves.
> But this is a contingent fact.
>
>
>
> real life has any joice, ai
>> has a programmed joice...nothing else.
>>
>
> You just show your prejudices against the computationalist hypothesis. But
> the point here is to try to figure out the consequences of that hypothesis.
> If we find a contradiction, then we will know better. To ridicule the
> hypothesis will not help. Up to now, we only find some weirdness, not a
> contradiction. The type of weirdness we find can be shown observable in
> nature. This confirms, (but does not prove 'course) the mechanist
> hypothesis.
>
> What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an artificial
> kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry a man who
> already accepted an artificial brain? Or do you think it would be a zombie
> (acting like a human, but having no consciousness).
>
> Don't worry. Artificial humans will not appear soon.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> On 18 Jan., 06:21, silky <michaelsli...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I'm not sure if this question is appropriate here, nevertheless, the
>>> most direct way to find out is to ask it :)
>>>
>>> Clearly, creating AI on a computer is a goal, and generally we'll try
>>> and implement to the same degree of computational"ness" as a human.
>>> But what would happen if we simply tried to re-implement the
>>> consciousness of a cat, or some "lesser" consciousness, but still
>>> alive, entity.
>>>
>>> It would be my (naive) assumption, that this is arguably trivial to
>>> do. We can design a program that has a desire to 'live', as desire to
>>> find mates, and otherwise entertain itself. In this way, with some
>>> other properties, we can easily model simply pets.
>>>
>>> I then wonder, what moral obligations do we owe these programs? Is it
>>> correct to turn them off? If so, why can't we do the same to a real
>>> life cat? Is it because we think we've not modelled something
>>> correctly, or is it because we feel it's acceptable as we've created
>>> this program, and hence know all its laws? On that basis, does it mean
>>> it's okay to "power off" a real life cat, if we are confident we know
>>> all of it's properties? Or is it not the knowning of the properties
>>> that is critical, but the fact that we, specifically, have direct
>>> control over it? Over its internals? (i.e. we can easily remove the
>>> lines of code that give it the desire to 'live'). But wouldn't, then,
>>> the removal of that code be equivelant to killing it? If not, why?
>>>
>>> Apologies if this is too vague or useless; it's just an idea that has
>>> been interesting me.
>>>
>>> --
>>> silky
>>>  http://www.mirios.com.au/
>>>  http://island.mirios.com.au/t/rigby+random+20
>>>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
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