Dear Bruno, you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand for (using MY vocabulary). ------------------------------------------------- On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> John, > > What makes you think that a brain is something material? I mean * > primitively* material. > > JM: I refer to 'matter' as a historically developed *figment* as used in "physical worldview" (I think in parentheses *by both of us*). Nothing (materially) PRIMITIVE, it is an 'explanation' of poorly understood and received observations at the various levels of the evolving human mindset (~actual enriching epistemic cognitive inventory and the pertinent (at that level) application of relational changing (=function??). > You know (I hope) that I pretend (at least) to have shown that *IF* we > are machine, and thus if our (generalized) brain is a machine, (for example: > we say "yes" to the doctor) *THEN* "we" are immaterial, and eventually > matter itself emerges from the statistical interference of computations. The > term computation is taken in its original mathematical (and unphysical, > immaterial) sense (of Church, Turing, Post, ...) > > Remember that "comp" is the belief (axiom, theory, hypothesis, faith) that > we can survive with an artificial digital (a priori primitively material for > the aristotelian) brain. Then I show that if we believe furthemore that > matter is primitive, like 99,999%of the Aristotelians, we get a > contradiction. > JM: "you have shown..." - your *DESCRIPTION of comp* and I do not throw out my belief to accept yours; first of all I carry a close, but different term for 'machine' because IMO numbers are not "god-made" primitives. They are the inventions in human speculation (cf: D. Bohm) because by simply observing nature you do not get TO numbers. Arithmetic is the 2nd step in accepting numbers. I feel your *"number = The Primitive*" as a vocabulary entry for *"God*", what I have no place for in *my *worldview either. I appreciated your extension of such term into *ourselves* (and also your earlier treatment of theology). > > My point can be sum up in one sentence: mechanism is incompatible with weak > materialism. > > Weak materialism is the doctrine that matter exist primitively, or that > physics, at least in its current naturalist and materialist paradigm, is > fundamental. > > What I say is that you cannot both believe that you are a machine, and that > matter exists *primitively*. > JM: the crux of my writings over the past years focussed on 'matter as figment' for physicalist views of the conventional (reductionist?) sciences. Weak, or strong. Thanks for including a definition of the 'weak'. Fundmental is 'something we have no access to' except in occasional partial revelations - interpreted for acceptance in our *individually different* *'minds'* as "perceived reality" (in our 1st person mini-solipsism). I do not differentiate ideational from matterly, I think in 'relations' not encoded, closer to mental (?) if there is such a distinction. The (our) specifications come from us. The 'physical view' is a fantastic edifice of balanced (mostly by math) equilibria and concepts and is very practical for our technology. Not a religion (science, faith-based, materialistic, or else). > > The new "fundamental science", becomes no more than elementary arithmetic, > or any of its Sigma_1 complete little cousins. By defining an observer by a > Löbian machine/number, we can recover the appearances of the physical laws > from the first person plural invariance. > JM: here I beg to differ, since what you listed are specimens from HUMAN thinking and this is not restrictve to nature's unlimited variability. *We don't know* (nor imagine) *what we don't know*. Our conventional science patterns try to 'explain' everything within our actual circle of knowledge and math is a great help. Whatever we don't know is called "chaotic or random", both interfering with anything physicists could formulate as 'physical laws'. random would screw it up, chaos is simply 'beyond it'. I know nothing about 'first person plural invariance'. > > Of course, brain will not disappear, nor the ring of Saturn, nor the far > away galaxies. It just means that eventually physicists will unify all the > forces in a relation in which all the physical unities will be simplified > away (like time vanishes in DeWitt Wheeler equation of the universe, for > example). > JM: "brain"? as in that neuron/glia etc. based *tissue contraption* 'placed into the skull', *-OR-* the 'brainfunction' assigned to such, callable *'mind'*? The 'doctor' can exchange only the former. I speculated a lot how to eliminate *'time'* and still keep relational changes. (No luck so far). > > We get more from the logic of self-reference: the unification will have to > be related to universal machine introspection, and this has the advantage of > explaining why the physical split into publicly sharable propositions (like > I *weigh* 60 kg) and private non sharable propositions (like I *feel* a bit > heavy today). > JM: we can 'share' a tiny little fraction of the possible propositions - most of them even deemed as (humanly?) impossible - the ones we know of. If we find matches we feel SSOO smart! I would suggest to apply similar openness into your arithmetic: don't be so sure that you know all about numbers and their manipulation. Just think about that mathematical 'real' earthquake when the zero was discovered: many 'firm' tenets changed. Or; when 'we' found the imaginaries. Are you sure that there is no further surprise AT ALL in math-thinking? > > For the layman, I would paraphrase Kroenecker again: > > God created the natural numbers, all the rest comes from subtle coherence > conditions in the numbers' dreams. > > If you don't like the numbers, you can take any universal combinatorial > system, like cellular automata, combinators, production systems, Turing > machines, Lambda expression, Lisp program, etc. The key is that physics > become "machine independent". If the observer is digitalizable, the laws of > physics should not depend of the choice of the universal base. > JM: Please, do not prescribe (limit?) what may be in stock "if you don't like numbers". It is an unlimited list from 'unlimited everything'. > > That "natural quantum choice" has to be justified by that invariance. I > think the "quantum" is related to the unique way (linearity) to have > consistent first person plural discourse. I recall those are defined in > (thought or MWI) experiment where populations of relative universal machines > are multiplied. > > So I reassure you. There was no extreme materialist stance. It is just that > comp is consistent with the existence of brains, galaxies bosons and > fermions. Comp is only inconsistent with the idea that such entities are > basic, or made of basic things. Indeed, we have to justify them by relations > which in fine bears only on numbers and numbers relations. > JM: I included this last 'oratorial' question and you replied to it in the sense I presumed. One thing though: I would add "...comp is consistent - *among unlimited others* - with the *IDEA (descripotion) of...* "and would not waste words on thoughts I deem 'figments' of our present redux-physical (etc.) view. Similarly I cannot argue with your decision about what "we have to justify - and by what ..." - it is your decision, I may conclude in 'more'(?). My agnosticism allows more openness than your (human?) 'gnostic' *numbers only* base. In a reverse view: you ended up with a *'system'* while I am sitting (still) in my *"I dunno*". > > Bruno > > > John > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > On 21 Jan 2010, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno, > while appreciating your reply to ferrari, I have to ask you a question. You > wrote: > > *"...What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an > artificial kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry > a man who already accepted an artificial brain? ..." * > > giving the *impression* that you may consider 'mind' identical (and > exclusively identically functioning) to the humanly so far described > tissue-contraption figment (?!) called "BRAIN". > (I am talking about 'reflexive' mAmps and topically meaningful blood-flow > surge), assigned to (ideational) mind-work). > > Is this rethorical question of yours a misunderstanding (mine) in the heat > of the argumentation, or an acceptance to an extreme materialistic stance? > > John M > > * * > > > On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> Hi ferrari, >> >> It is weird, my computer decided that this mail was junk mail. >> It is the first time it put an everything list post in the junk list. I am >> afraid you hurt its susceptibility :) >> >> >> On 20 Jan 2010, at 19:15, ferrari wrote: >> >> come on silky, >>> >>> the answer you know yourself of course. >>> >>> artificial is artificial. >>> >> >> That is true! artificial is a distinction introduced by humans. (I know >> it is not what you mean, but I let you think). >> >> >> >> to say you are alive, you must be able to >>> reflect on yourself. >>> >> >> Theoretical computer science is born from the (non obvious) discovery that >> machine *can* reflect on themselves (in many strong senses). >> (More on this in the seventh step thread). >> >> >> >> you must be able to >>> create >>> >> >> Why do you think Emil post, the first to understand Church thesis (10 >> years before Church), decide to call "creative" the set theoretical >> definition of machine universality? >> >> >> >> and to understand without someone teaching you >>> >> >> We all need teachers, except God or any basic fundamental closed (no >> inputs/no outputs) reality. >> >> >> >> and most >>> important there is nobody who turns >>> you on or off (exept your girlfriend ;)). >>> >> >> The universal machines build by humans can be said to be born as slaves. >> But this is a contingent fact. >> >> >> >> real life has any joice, ai >>> has a programmed joice...nothing else. >>> >> >> You just show your prejudices against the computationalist hypothesis. But >> the point here is to try to figure out the consequences of that hypothesis. >> If we find a contradiction, then we will know better. To ridicule the >> hypothesis will not help. Up to now, we only find some weirdness, not a >> contradiction. The type of weirdness we find can be shown observable in >> nature. This confirms, (but does not prove 'course) the mechanist >> hypothesis. >> >> What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an >> artificial kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry >> a man who already accepted an artificial brain? Or do you think it would be >> a zombie (acting like a human, but having no consciousness). >> >> Don't worry. Artificial humans will not appear soon. >> >> Best, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> On 18 Jan., 06:21, silky <michaelsli...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> I'm not sure if this question is appropriate here, nevertheless, the >>>> most direct way to find out is to ask it :) >>>> >>>> Clearly, creating AI on a computer is a goal, and generally we'll try >>>> and implement to the same degree of computational"ness" as a human. >>>> But what would happen if we simply tried to re-implement the >>>> consciousness of a cat, or some "lesser" consciousness, but still >>>> alive, entity. >>>> >>>> It would be my (naive) assumption, that this is arguably trivial to >>>> do. We can design a program that has a desire to 'live', as desire to >>>> find mates, and otherwise entertain itself. In this way, with some >>>> other properties, we can easily model simply pets. >>>> >>>> I then wonder, what moral obligations do we owe these programs? Is it >>>> correct to turn them off? If so, why can't we do the same to a real >>>> life cat? Is it because we think we've not modelled something >>>> correctly, or is it because we feel it's acceptable as we've created >>>> this program, and hence know all its laws? On that basis, does it mean >>>> it's okay to "power off" a real life cat, if we are confident we know >>>> all of it's properties? Or is it not the knowning of the properties >>>> that is critical, but the fact that we, specifically, have direct >>>> control over it? Over its internals? (i.e. we can easily remove the >>>> lines of code that give it the desire to 'live'). But wouldn't, then, >>>> the removal of that code be equivelant to killing it? If not, why? >>>> >>>> Apologies if this is too vague or useless; it's just an idea that has >>>> been interesting me. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> silky >>>> http://www.mirios.com.au/ >>>> http://island.mirios.com.au/t/rigby+random+20 >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >--
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