Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:

Okay, first question: in step 5, assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps, suppose I agree to be transported to Brussels and the
process in step 5 is performed. What are you saying would be my
experience? That I have a 50-50 chance of ending up in Amsterdam with a
copy of me believing he was transported to Brussels, versus being
transported to Brussels with a copy of me believing he is still in

Second question: in step 6, again assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps. Am I correct in my understanding that what you are
describing is the doctor, instead of reconstituting me in Brussels, is
merely taking the digital description of me and giving it as input to a
program which simulates me interacting with a Brussels-like environment?
That is, after T seconds of simulated time, the program has a new digital
description of me, one that reflects T seconds of experience in the
virtual Brussels?

And that my subjective experience would be the same as you are claiming
for step 5, except that instead of actually being in Brussels either I or
the copy would be in the simulated Brussels, believing, Matrix-like, that
it was real?
Mark Buda <>
I get my monkeys for nothing and my chimps for free.

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