On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:


Okay, first question: in step 5, assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps, suppose I agree to be transported to Brussels

From where? And how?

and the
process in step 5 is performed. What are you saying would be my
experience? That I have a 50-50 chance of ending up in Amsterdam with a
copy of me believing he was transported to Brussels, versus being
transported to Brussels with a copy of me believing he is still in

I don't understand clearly your protocol.

All what I say in step 5 is that a teleportation from x to y without annihilation of the "original" (thus at x) is equivalent with a duplication, with annihilation of the original from x to (x and y). In x, an absence of annihilation can be considered as an annihilation followed by a reconstitution with a zero delay. This follows from digitalism which prevents to use a notion of continuity based on the reals, for example. This is already in contradiction with Robert Nozick who uses a notion of closer continuer. From the first person point of view, such "topology" cannot be recognized.

Second question: in step 6, again assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps. Am I correct in my understanding that what you are
describing is the doctor, instead of reconstituting me in Brussels, is
merely taking the digital description of me and giving it as input to a program which simulates me interacting with a Brussels-like environment? That is, after T seconds of simulated time, the program has a new digital
description of me, one that reflects T seconds of experience in the
virtual Brussels?

Yes, in case the description of you has been made at the correct substitution level. Somehow you are the program, and the virtual machine simulates Brussels perfectly (for a non null duration).

And that my subjective experience would be the same as you are claiming for step 5, except that instead of actually being in Brussels either I or the copy would be in the simulated Brussels, believing, Matrix-like, that
it was real?

Yes, except that in all steps, the experiencer knows the protocol in advance, so he/she knows that he/she is in a virtual environment, like in a video game or in a lucid dream.

Step 6 recapitulates all the five preceding steps, except that the reconstitution are done in virtual (digital simulation) of the environment.

Are you OK with the first six steps? Assuming comp! I am only asking if you see that those propositions follow from the comp hypothesis (not if you believe them!).

Bruno Marchal


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