On 26 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm

Okay, first question: in step 5, assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps, suppose I agree to be transported to Brussels

From where? And how?


and the
process in step 5 is performed. What are you saying would be my
experience? That I have a 50-50 chance of ending up in Amsterdam with a
copy of me believing he was transported to Brussels, versus being
transported to Brussels with a copy of me believing he is still in
Amsterdam?

I don't understand clearly your protocol.

All what I say in step 5 is that a teleportation from x to y without annihilation of the "original" (thus at x) is equivalent with a duplication, with annihilation of the original from x to (x and y). In x, an absence of annihilation can be considered as an annihilation followed by a reconstitution with a zero delay. This follows from digitalism which prevents to use a notion of continuity based on the reals, for example. This is already in contradiction with Robert Nozick who uses a notion of closer continuer. From the first person point of view, such "topology" cannot be recognized.

So far as we know QM is based on the reals (and the complex). If you tried to simulate QM digitally there would be a smallest non- zero probability and then the multiple-world interpretation wouldn't hold.

If I simulate QM digitally, I will approximate the real or complex numbers by rational numbers or couples of rational numbers. They are dense on the line, so there is will be no smallest non zero probability. Now, the QM, or any physical laws, extracted from the UD are based on the whole UD*, including the "product" of programs with the dovetailing on the reals (complex, quaternion, octonion, etc.). This is why comp implies the first person are determined by a continuum of possibilities including event with arbitarily small probabilities (a point more or less confirmed mathematically by the material hypostases Bp & Dt (& p)).

Here the product of program_1 and program_2 is defined by any program_k which is itself a dovetailer on program_1 and program_2 (with or without making them interact).

Also it seems that it would be impossible to obtain the information to duplicate a person without destroying them.

I guess you are alluding to the quantum non cloning theorem. But the non cloning theorem asserts that we cannot duplicate an unkown state of matter. With comp persons are either described by known states, or by their quantum state, and those don't need to be known for being generated (infinitely often) by the UD.

To be clear on this:
IF the brain is a quantum machine: the thought experiments in step 1-6 can no more be done, but for reasons which appears irrelevant at step seven & eight. Note also that the brain works like a quantum computer is quite a speculation, but in any case, the step seven makes any feasibility concerns irrelevant. The UD generate and simulates all quantum computer, and from inside even many non computable things.

Actually the non cloning theorem is a direct intuitive consequence of comp, given that any pieces of matter is the result of a sum on an infinity (even a priori non enumerable) computations.



Once having obtained the information you could in principle make multiple copies, one of which could replace the original. But I think this would leave some gap in the continuity of their consciousness.

They may feel a buzz during the scanning. But once the information is gathered, I don't see how the person can be aware of anything more than that buzz, given that he is reconstituted in the state preceding the gap/delay. You would need a magical (non comp) ability of the mind to detect such a gap.




That's not an argument against COMP though, since just getting a concussion also leaves a gap.

There is no doubt that a real teleportation experiment would lead a trace, if only the queue at the teleport gates, and the administrative stuff before the departure. The first real technic will probably involve anesthesia and ultracold temperature ... But nobody will be aware of any gap other than the trip itself.
There are two reasons for this
1) comp is false, in which case they will die (be aware of no gap). (normally. If comp is false, eventually it will depend of which theory of mind you are using, of course). 2) comp is true, in which case the "gap" is not an event impinging on their information treatment abilities (like the delays).

Bruno



Brent




Second question: in step 6, again assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps. Am I correct in my understanding that what you are
describing is the doctor, instead of reconstituting me in Brussels, is merely taking the digital description of me and giving it as input to a program which simulates me interacting with a Brussels-like environment? That is, after T seconds of simulated time, the program has a new digital
description of me, one that reflects T seconds of experience in the
virtual Brussels?

Yes, in case the description of you has been made at the correct substitution level. Somehow you are the program, and the virtual machine simulates Brussels perfectly (for a non null duration).




And that my subjective experience would be the same as you are claiming for step 5, except that instead of actually being in Brussels either I or the copy would be in the simulated Brussels, believing, Matrix- like, that
it was real?

Yes, except that in all steps, the experiencer knows the protocol in advance, so he/she knows that he/she is in a virtual environment, like in a video game or in a lucid dream.

Step 6 recapitulates all the five preceding steps, except that the reconstitution are done in virtual (digital simulation) of the environment.


Are you OK with the first six steps? Assuming comp! I am only asking if you see that those propositions follow from the comp hypothesis (not if you believe them!).


Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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