Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:
Okay, first question: in step 5, assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps, suppose I agree to be transported to Brussels
From where? And how?
process in step 5 is performed. What are you saying would be my
experience? That I have a 50-50 chance of ending up in Amsterdam
copy of me believing he was transported to Brussels, versus being
transported to Brussels with a copy of me believing he is still in
I don't understand clearly your protocol.
All what I say in step 5 is that a teleportation from x to y without
annihilation of the "original" (thus at x) is equivalent with a
duplication, with annihilation of the original from x to (x and y).
In x, an absence of annihilation can be considered as an
annihilation followed by a reconstitution with a zero delay. This
follows from digitalism which prevents to use a notion of continuity
based on the reals, for example.
This is already in contradiction with Robert Nozick who uses a
notion of closer continuer. From the first person point of view,
such "topology" cannot be recognized.
So far as we know QM is based on the reals (and the complex). If you
tried to simulate QM digitally there would be a smallest non-zero
probability and then the multiple-world interpretation wouldn't hold.
If I simulate QM digitally, I will approximate the real or complex
numbers by rational numbers or couples of rational numbers. They are
dense on the line, so there is will be no smallest non zero probability.
But this is where my finitist intuition comes in. To make the rationals
dense on the line seems to assume a realized infinity. The smallest
non-zero number the UD generates is 1. The largest number it has
generated by a given step is some finite integer. So it can only
generate rationals dense on the real line after infinitely many steps.
Now, the QM, or any physical laws, extracted from the UD are based on
the whole UD*, including the "product" of programs with the
dovetailing on the reals (complex, quaternion, octonion, etc.). This
is why comp implies the first person are determined by a continuum of
possibilities including event with arbitarily small probabilities (a
point more or less confirmed mathematically by the material hypostases
Bp & Dt (& p)).
Here the product of program_1 and program_2 is defined by any
program_k which is itself a dovetailer on program_1 and program_2
(with or without making them interact).
Also it seems that it would be impossible to obtain the information
to duplicate a person without destroying them.
I guess you are alluding to the quantum non cloning theorem. But the
non cloning theorem asserts that we cannot duplicate an unkown state
of matter. With comp persons are either described by known states, or
by their quantum state, and those don't need to be known for being
generated (infinitely often) by the UD.
No, I don't think QM is important to the brain (although it may play
some small part to solve the problem of Buridan's ass). I was referring
to more mundane problems of mapping the connections and dynamics of a
brain. Lawrence Krauss discusses these in his book, "The Physics of
To be clear on this:
IF the brain is a quantum machine: the thought experiments in step 1-6
can no more be done, but for reasons which appears irrelevant at step
seven & eight.
Note also that the brain works like a quantum computer is quite a
speculation, but in any case, the step seven makes any feasibility
concerns irrelevant. The UD generate and simulates all quantum
computer, and from inside even many non computable things.
Actually the non cloning theorem is a direct intuitive consequence of
comp, given that any pieces of matter is the result of a sum on an
infinity (even a priori non enumerable) computations.
Once having obtained the information you could in principle make
multiple copies, one of which could replace the original. But I
think this would leave some gap in the continuity of their
They may feel a buzz during the scanning. But once the information is
gathered, I don't see how the person can be aware of anything more
than that buzz, given that he is reconstituted in the state preceding
the gap/delay. You would need a magical (non comp) ability of the mind
to detect such a gap.
That's not an argument against COMP though, since just getting a
concussion also leaves a gap.
There is no doubt that a real teleportation experiment would lead a
trace, if only the queue at the teleport gates, and the administrative
stuff before the departure.
The first real technic will probably involve anesthesia and ultracold
temperature ... But nobody will be aware of any gap other than the
There are two reasons for this
1) comp is false, in which case they will die (be aware of no gap).
(normally. If comp is false, eventually it will depend of which theory
of mind you are using, of course).
2) comp is true, in which case the "gap" is not an event impinging on
their information treatment abilities (like the delays).
It would be a gap just like an anesthesia gap or like a period of
amnesia due to a concussion. From my experience with both, there is a
certain "start-up" period. It's not that your mind just takes up
exactly where it left off. So it doesn't take magic to perceive the
gap. I only bring this up because it seems contrary to the idea that
the brain processes can be divided up into arbitrarily short duration OMs.
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