On 11 Feb 2010, at 06:46, Jack Mallah wrote:

## Advertising

It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread(which is actually more important) but that could be in a few days.--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their normal size, andthe other half were twice their normal size? How would this bepredicted to effect your measure?If it had any effect - and as I said, I don't think it would in a QMuniverse - I guess it would decrease the measure of part of yourbrain and increase that of the other part. That may sound weird butit's certainly possible for one part of a parallel computation tohave more measure than the rest which can be done by duplicatingonly that part of the brain. See my paper on partial brains:http://cogprints.org/6321/ --- On Thu, 1/28/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:Do you think that simply doubling up the size of electroniccomponents (much easier to do than making brains bigger) woulddouble measure?The effect should be the same for brains or electronics.You could then flick the switch and alternate between two separatebut parallel circuits or one circuit. Would flicking the switchcause a doubling/halving of measure?If the circuits don't interact, then it is two separateimplementations, and measure would double. If they do interact, weare back to 'big components' which as I said could go either way.Would it be tantamount to killing one of the consciousnesses everytime you did it?Basically. Killing usually implies an irreversible process;otherwise, someone is liable to come along and flick the switchback, so it's more like knocking someone out. If the measure ishalved and then you break the switch so it can't go back, that wouldbe, yes.--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Does the size of the components affects the computation?Other than measure, the implemented computation would be the same,at least for the cases that matter.

`So, the behavior would not change, but the consciousness would be`

`different? A little thin brain would produce a zombie?`

I don't assume the quantum stuff. It is what I want to understand.I gave an argument showing that if we assume computationalism, thenwe have to derive physics from (classical) computer scienceOf course I know about your argument. It's false.

`I guess you mean invalid. What is invalid in the reasoning? Have you`

`follow the last year new exposition on this list MGA (Movie Graph`

`Argument). I have understood eventually that we don't need to use the`

`counterfactual analysis à-la-Maudlin. MGA is more general (and older).`

`The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute`

`consciousness to a movie of a computation, but this forces to confuse`

`a computation (relation between numbers, or combinators) and a`

`description of a computation (like a Gödel number of a (finite) piece`

`of a computation). Those things are related, but different.`

You wrote convincing posts on the implementation problem. Ithought, and still think, that you understood that there is noobvious way to attribute a computation to a physical process. Withstrict criteria we get nothing, with weak criteria even a rockthinks.The implementation problem is: Given a physical or mathematicalsystem, does it implement a given computation? As you say, if theanswer is always "yes" - as it is on a naive definition ofimplementation - then computationalism can not work.This was an important problem - which I presented a solution for inmy '07 MCI paper:http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0544

`What you call computationalism is a form of physicalist`

`computationalism. The Movie graph argument show it is inconsistent`

`with "yes doctor + Church thesis" and "yes doctor" follows from the`

`physicalist computationalism assumption.`

`And as you know, physicalist computationalism raises the`

`implementation problem.`

So I now consider it a solved problem, using my CSSA framework. Thesolution presented there does need a bit of refinement and I plan towrite up a separate paper to present it more clearly and hopefullyget some attention for it, but the main ideas are there.But that's only half the story. There is still the measure problem:Given that a system does implement some set of computations, what isthe measure for each? Without the answer to that, you can't predictwhat a typical observer would see. This problem remains unsolved(though I do have proposals in the paper) and relates to the problemof size.

`The measure is determined relatively by the universal machine by the`

`set of the maximal consistent extensions of its beliefs. The Gödel-Löb-`

`Solovay logics of self-reference provides the math, and explains how`

`the "coupling consciousness realities" emerges from the numbers.`

-- Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.