On 11 Feb 2010, at 06:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread
(which is actually more important) but that could be in a few days.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their normal size, and
the other half were twice their normal size? How would this be
predicted to effect your measure?
If it had any effect - and as I said, I don't think it would in a QM
universe - I guess it would decrease the measure of part of your
brain and increase that of the other part. That may sound weird but
it's certainly possible for one part of a parallel computation to
have more measure than the rest which can be done by duplicating
only that part of the brain. See my paper on partial brains:
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
Do you think that simply doubling up the size of electronic
components (much easier to do than making brains bigger) would
The effect should be the same for brains or electronics.
You could then flick the switch and alternate between two separate
but parallel circuits or one circuit. Would flicking the switch
cause a doubling/halving of measure?
If the circuits don't interact, then it is two separate
implementations, and measure would double. If they do interact, we
are back to 'big components' which as I said could go either way.
Would it be tantamount to killing one of the consciousnesses every
time you did it?
Basically. Killing usually implies an irreversible process;
otherwise, someone is liable to come along and flick the switch
back, so it's more like knocking someone out. If the measure is
halved and then you break the switch so it can't go back, that would
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Does the size of the components affects the computation?
Other than measure, the implemented computation would be the same,
at least for the cases that matter.
So, the behavior would not change, but the consciousness would be
different? A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
I don't assume the quantum stuff. It is what I want to understand.
I gave an argument showing that if we assume computationalism, then
we have to derive physics from (classical) computer science
Of course I know about your argument. It's false.
I guess you mean invalid. What is invalid in the reasoning? Have you
follow the last year new exposition on this list MGA (Movie Graph
Argument). I have understood eventually that we don't need to use the
counterfactual analysis à-la-Maudlin. MGA is more general (and older).
The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute
consciousness to a movie of a computation, but this forces to confuse
a computation (relation between numbers, or combinators) and a
description of a computation (like a Gödel number of a (finite) piece
of a computation). Those things are related, but different.
You wrote convincing posts on the implementation problem. I
thought, and still think, that you understood that there is no
obvious way to attribute a computation to a physical process. With
strict criteria we get nothing, with weak criteria even a rock
The implementation problem is: Given a physical or mathematical
system, does it implement a given computation? As you say, if the
answer is always "yes" - as it is on a naive definition of
implementation - then computationalism can not work.
This was an important problem - which I presented a solution for in
my '07 MCI paper:
What you call computationalism is a form of physicalist
computationalism. The Movie graph argument show it is inconsistent
with "yes doctor + Church thesis" and "yes doctor" follows from the
physicalist computationalism assumption.
And as you know, physicalist computationalism raises the
So I now consider it a solved problem, using my CSSA framework. The
solution presented there does need a bit of refinement and I plan to
write up a separate paper to present it more clearly and hopefully
get some attention for it, but the main ideas are there.
But that's only half the story. There is still the measure problem:
Given that a system does implement some set of computations, what is
the measure for each? Without the answer to that, you can't predict
what a typical observer would see. This problem remains unsolved
(though I do have proposals in the paper) and relates to the problem
The measure is determined relatively by the universal machine by the
set of the maximal consistent extensions of its beliefs. The Gödel-Löb-
Solovay logics of self-reference provides the math, and explains how
the "coupling consciousness realities" emerges from the numbers.
-- Bruno Marchal
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