--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> A little thin brain would produce a zombie?

Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low measure; it's a 
brain with zero measure.  So the answer is obviously no - it would not be a 
zombie.  Stop abusing the language.

We know that small terms in the wavefunction have low measure.  I would not 
call these terms 'zombies'.  Many small terms together can equal or exceed the 
measure of big terms.

> MGA is more general (and older). The only way to escape the conclusion would 
> be to attribute consciousness to a movie of a computation

That's not true.  For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain has 
counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper: 

> What you call computationalism is a form of physicalist computationalism.

Not true.  It could be physicalist or platonist - mathematical systems can 
implement computations if the exist in a strong enough (Platonic) sense.  I am 
agnostic on Platonism.

> The measure is determined relatively by the universal machine by the set of 
> the maximal consistent extensions of its beliefs.

Also not true.  That's just your idea for how it should be done, which stems 
from your false beliefs in QTI.


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