On 11 Feb 2010, at 17:14, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low
measure; it's a brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously
no - it would not be a zombie. Stop abusing the language.
We know that small terms in the wavefunction have low measure. I
would not call these terms 'zombies'. Many small terms together can
equal or exceed the measure of big terms.
MGA is more general (and older). The only way to escape the
conclusion would be to attribute consciousness to a movie of a
That's not true. For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a
brain has counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain
It is not a question of true or false, but of presenting a valid or
non valid deduction. I don't see anything in your comment or links
which prevents the conclusions of being reached from the assumptions.
If you think so, tell me at which step, and provide a justification.
You may read the archives, for new recent presentation or my papers,
and eventually point on something you don't understand.
> What you call computationalism is a form of physicalist
Not true. It could be physicalist or platonist - mathematical
systems can implement computations if the exist in a strong enough
(Platonic) sense. I am agnostic on Platonism.
This contradicts your definition of computationalism given in your
papers. I have no more clue about your assumptions, nor what you mean
I quote your glossary: <<Computationalism: The philosophical belief
that consciousness arises as a result of
implementation of computations by physical systems. >> (my emphasis)
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