On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every > morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first- > person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third- > person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional > existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we > possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the > existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely > 3-p grounds. Further, if we believe that 3-p process is a closed and > sufficient explanation for all events, this of course leads to the > uncomfortable conclusion (referred to, for example, by Chalmers in > TCM) that 1-p conscious phenomena (the "raw feels" of sight, sound, > pain, fear and all the rest) are totally irrelevant to what's > happening, including our every thought and action. > > But doesn't this lead to paradox? For example, how are we able to > refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our > behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3- > p perspective? Citing "identity" doesn't seem to help here - the > issue is how 1-p phenomena could ever emerge as features of our shared > behavioural world (including, of course, talking about them) if they > are forever inaccessible from a causally closed and sufficient 3-p > perspective. Does this in fact lead to the conclusion that the 3-p > world can't be causally closed to 1-p experience, and that I really do > withdraw my finger from the fire because it hurts, and not just > because C-fibres are firing? But how?
Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the computation, you have the experience. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.