On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
> morning for the last week.  Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
> person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
> person perspective?  The only rationale for adducing the additional
> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some).  We can't "compute" the
> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely
> 3-p grounds.  Further, if we believe that 3-p process is a closed and
> sufficient explanation for all events, this of course leads to the
> uncomfortable conclusion (referred to, for example, by Chalmers in
> TCM) that 1-p conscious phenomena (the "raw feels" of sight, sound,
> pain, fear and all the rest) are totally irrelevant to what's
> happening, including our every thought and action.
>
> But doesn't this lead to paradox?  For example, how are we able to
> refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our
> behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3-
> p perspective?  Citing "identity" doesn't seem to help here - the
> issue is how 1-p phenomena could ever emerge as features of our shared
> behavioural world (including, of course, talking about them) if they
> are forever inaccessible from a causally closed and sufficient 3-p
> perspective.  Does this in fact lead to the conclusion that the 3-p
> world can't be causally closed to 1-p experience, and that I really do
> withdraw my finger from the fire because it hurts, and not just
> because C-fibres are firing?  But how?

Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
computation, you have the experience.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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