>  Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
> combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
> trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?

I suspect there's a problem either way.  AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two irreducibly different renditions of a
given state of affairs (hence not "identical" in any
non-question-begging sense of the term). It then follows that, in
order to fully account for a given set of events involving both
renditions, you have to choose between some sort of non-interacting
parallelism, or the conundrum of how one "causally closed" account
becomes informed about the other, or the frank denial of one or the
other rendition.  None of these options seems satisfactory.

The way out would be if both 3-p and 1-p were reconcilable in terms of
a more fundamental level, in terms of which the special relevance of
each partial narrative was linked to its proper range of outcomes.  In
point of fact, of course, this is the "folk psychological" position,
and it seems all too easy simply to dismiss this as terminating in
naive dualism.  However, my early-morning musings include a glimmering
of how this might be made to work - without doing terminal violence to
either rendition - but unfortunately there is insufficient space in
the margin of this post to write it down (as yet).

David

On 16 February 2010 18:19, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> Hi,
>
>        Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
> combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
> trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of David Nyman
> Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2010 1:08 PM
> To: Everything List
> Subject: On the computability of consciousness
>
> This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every morning
> for the last week.  Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first- person
> experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third- person
> perspective?  The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of
> any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we possess it (or
> "seem" to, according to some).  We can't "compute" the existence of any 1-p
> experiential component of a 3-p process on purely 3-p grounds.  Further, if
> we believe that 3-p process is a closed and sufficient explanation for all
> events, this of course leads to the uncomfortable conclusion (referred to,
> for example, by Chalmers in TCM) that 1-p conscious phenomena (the "raw
> feels" of sight, sound, pain, fear and all the rest) are totally irrelevant
> to what's happening, including our every thought and action.
>
> But doesn't this lead to paradox?  For example, how are we able to refer to
> these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our behaviour - i.e.
> they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3- p perspective?  Citing
> "identity" doesn't seem to help here - the issue is how 1-p phenomena could
> ever emerge as features of our shared behavioural world (including, of
> course, talking about them) if they are forever inaccessible from a causally
> closed and sufficient 3-p perspective.  Does this in fact lead to the
> conclusion that the 3-p world can't be causally closed to 1-p experience,
> and that I really do withdraw my finger from the fire because it hurts, and
> not just because C-fibres are firing?  But how?
>
> David
>
>
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